Cryptography algorithm standards play a key role both to the practice of information security and to cryptography theory research. Among them, the MQV and HMQV protocols ((H)MQV, in short) are a family of (implicitly authenticated) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols that are widely standardized and deployed. In this work, from some new perspectives and approaches and under some new design rationales and insights, we develop a new family of practical implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and easy deployment. We make detailed comparisons between our new DHKE protocols and (H)MQV, showing that the newly developed protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Along the way, guided by our new design rationales, we also identify a new vulnerability of (H)MQV, which brings some new perspectives (e.g., session-key computational fairness) to the literature.
Introduction
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols [21] are at the root of public-key cryptography, and are one of the main pillars of both theory and practice of cryptography [14] . Among them, the (H)MQV protocols [44, 40, 37, 45] are among the most efficient DHKE protocols that provide (implicit) mutual authentications based upon public-key cryptography, and are widely standardized [4, 5, 34, 35, 49, 50, 56] . In particular, it has been announced by the US National Security Agency as the key exchange mechanism underlying "the next generation cryptography to protect US government information", including the protection of "classified or mission critical national security information" [50, 37] .
Despite its seemingly conceptual simplicity, designing "sound" and "right" DHKE protocols turns out to be extremely error prone and can be notoriously subtle, particularly witnessed by the evolution history of (H)MQV [44, 36, 40, 37, 45] . Also, the analysis of even a simple cryptographic protocol in intricate adversarial settings like the Internet can be a luxury and dauntingly complex task [11, 37] . The reason for this is the high system complexity and enormous number of subtleties surrounding the design, definition and analysis of DHKE protocols. Given the intensive investigation of (H)MQV both from cryptography theory research and from industrial engineering, it may be commonly suggested that the state-of-the-art of (H)MQV, commonly viewed as the best available in the integrity of security and protocol efficiency, should hardly be broken.
In this work, we start with investigating highly practical mechanisms in the random oracle (RO) model, referred to as non-malleable joint proof-of-knowledge (NMJPOK) for presentation simplicity, for proving DH-knowledges, say both the secret-key and the DH-exponent, jointly and non-malleably in concurrent settings like the Internet. In light of this line of investigations, we develop a new family of practical implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols, referred to as OAKE 1 and single-hash OAKE protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and easy deployment. For presentation simplicity, we refer to the newly developed DHKE protocols as (s)OAKE. We then compare and justify (s)OAKE protocols with (H)MQV in detail, which shows that our new protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Detailed comparisons are listed in Section 4 after motivating the design rationales and building tools and after presenting the detailed OAKE specifications. Guided by our new design rationales, in this work we particularly identify a new vulnerability of (H)MQV beyond the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) framework, which brings some new perspectives (e.g., session-key computational fairness) to the literature. We do not know how to fix (H)MQV against this newly identified vulnerability without sacrificing the provable security in the CK framework and many more other advantages enjoyed by (s)OAKE (with details referred to Section 4. 2) , which also further justifies and highlights the careful design of (s)OAKE.
We suggest the developed (s)OAKE protocols are themselves a clear witness to the usefulness of the new design rationales and building tool with NMJPOK, as (s)OAKE aims for an alternative of (H)MQV that is widely standardized and deployed and as with the new design rationales we can identify some new vulnerabilities bringing new perspectives to the literature of DHKE. But at the same time, the new design rationales and building tools, developed for (s)OAKE, can also be of independent interest, and may trigger more applications. In particular, based on this work, in a subsequent separate work we present the definition and candidates of non-malleable extractable one-way functions (NME-OWF), which can be viewed as pairing-based NMJPOK without random oracles, and demonstrate the applications of NME-OWF to both theory (e.g., 3-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge, etc) and applications (e.g., ID-based cryptography, etc) of cryptography.
Preliminaries
Notations: If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r) is the result of running A on inputs x 1 , x 2 , · · · and coins r. We let y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r) denote the experiment of picking r at random and letting y be A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r). If S is a finite set then x ← S, sometimes also written as x ∈ R S, is the operation of picking an element uniformly from S. If α is neither an algorithm nor a set then x ← α is a simple assignment statement.
Let G ′ be a finite Abelian group of order N , G be a subgroup of prime order q in G ′ . Denote by g a generator of G, by 1 G the identity element, by G \ 1 G = G − {1 G } the set of elements of G except 1 G and by t = N q the cofactor. In this work, we use multiplicative notation for the group operation in G ′ . We assume the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds over G, which says that given X = g x , Y = g y ← G (i.e., each of x and y is taken uniformly at random from Z q ) no efficient (say, probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithm can compute CDH(X, Y ) = g xy . Let (A = g a , a) (resp., (X = g x , x)) be the public-key and secret-key (resp., the DH-component and DH-exponent) of player A, and (B = g b , b) (resp., (Y = g y , y)) be the public-key and secret-key (resp., the DH-component and DH-exponent) of playerB, where a, x, b, y are taken randomly and independently from Z * q . (H)MQV is recalled in Figure 1 (page 4) , and the (H)MQV variants are recalled in Appendix A, where on a security parameter k H K (resp., h) is a hash function of k-bit (resp., l-bit) output and l is set to be |q|/2.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [51] . Let G be a cyclic group generated by an element g, and a decision predicate algorithm O be a (full) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Oracle for the group G and generator g such that on input (U, V, Z), for arbitrary (U, V ) ∈ G 2 , oracle O outputs 1 if and only if Z = CDH(U, V ). We say the GDH assumption holds in G if for any polynomial-time CDH solver for G, the probability that on a pair of random elements (X, Y ) ← G the solver computes the correct value CDH(X, Y ) is negligible, even when the algorithm is provided with the (full) DDH-oracle O for G. The probability is taken over the random coins of the solver, and the choice of X, Y (each one of them is taken uniformly at random in G).
Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA). Informally speaking, the KEA assumption says that, suppose on input (g, C = g c ), where c is taken uniformly at random from Z * q , a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A outputs (Y, Z = Y c ) ∈ G 2 , then the discrete logarithm y of Y = g y can be efficiently extracted from the input (g, C) and the random coins used by A. The formal definition is referred to Definition G.3 (page 39) . In other words, given (g, C = g c ) the "only way" to produce (Y, Z = Y c ) is to choose y and compute (Y = g y , Z = C y ). The KEA assumption is derived from the CDH assumption, and is a non-black-box assumption by nature [7] . The KEA assumption was introduced in [17] , and has been used in many subsequent works (e.g., [32, 8, 7, 19, 37, 18, 20] , etc). In particular, the KEA assumption plays a critical role for provable deniability of authentication and key-exchange (e.g., [19, 37, 20] ).
Simultaneous exponentiation. Given two generators g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and two values x, y ∈ Z q , Â , A, X = g , the maliciousB is infeasible to set ey to a predetermined value,B can always set the value db = b at its wish as d = 1 for sN M JP OK (b,y) . But,B is still infeasible to set the value b correlated to ey = h(B, X, Y )y, particularly because the value B is put into the input of e. Specifically, for any value B = g b set byB, with the goal of making b and ey correlated, the probability that the values ey = h(B, X, Y )y and b satisfy some predetermined (polynomial-time computable) relation R is negligible in the RO model (by the birthday paradox). In particular, the probability that Pr[b = f (ey)] or Pr[f (b) = ey], where f is some predetermined polynomial-time computable function (that is in turn determined by the predetermined relation R), is negligible in the RO model, no matter how the maliciousB does.
Note that N M JP OK (b,y) = X db+ey = (B d Y e ) x , where d = h(B, X) and e = h(X, Y ), actually can be used to demonstrate the knowledge of x. The key observation now is: in order forÂ to additionally prove the knowledge of its secret-key a, we can multiply X db+ey by another POK Y ca for c = h(A, Y ). This yields KÂ = B dx Y ca+ex = A cy X db+ey = KB, where KÂ (resp., KB) is computed byÂ (resp., B) respectively. As we aim for secure DHKE protocols in concurrent settings like the Internet, we let the values KÂ and KB commit to the complete session tag by putting users' identities into the inputs of d and/or e, which particularly ensures the "key-control" property of [40] for DHKE. All the observations are boiled down to the OAKE protocol, which is depicted in Figure 1 . The version derived from sNMJPOK, referred to as single-hash OAKE (sOAKE), is also depicted in Figure 1 . Note that the output length of h, i.e., l, is set to be |q|/2 in (H)MQV, but approximately |q| in OAKE and sOAKE protocols. In particular, with the (s)OAKE protocol family, h and H K (that is used for deriving the session-key K) can be identical. Also note that, for (s)OAKE,Â (resp.,B) can offline pre-compute X and B dx (resp., Y and A cy ). Some (s)OAKE variants are given in Appendix C. We also highlight another property, called tag-based self-seal (TBSS), of (s)OAKE in the RO model: given any complete session tag (Â, A,B, B, X, Y ) and any α ∈ G \ 1 G , Pr[KÂ = KB = α] ≤ and KB = A cyt X dbt+eyt . The subgroup test is performed as follows: each player first verifies that its peer's DH-component is in G ′ , and then acts in accordance with one of the following two cases.
Case-1. If B dxt and Y cat+ext (resp., A cyt and X dbt+eyt ) are computed separately, particularly when B dxt (resp., A cyt ) is offline pre-computed byÂ (resp.,B),Â (resp.,B) checks that Y cat+ext = 1 G (resp., X dbt+eyt = 1 G );
Case-2. In case of no separate computation,Â (resp.,B) verifies KÂ = 1 G (resp., KB = 1 G ). Note that the checking of KÂ = 1 G and KB = 1 G , as done in MQV, does not fully guarantee X t = 1 G or Y t = 1 G , but it still provides reasonable assurance in the elliptic curve setting as clarified above.
We remark that the embedded subgroup test in Case-1, well supported by (s)OAKE, provides stronger security guarantee than that in Case-2 as done in (H)MQV. Note that (H)MQV cannot offline precompute the values B e and A d to ease the more robust Case-1 embedded subgroup test. We note that the damage caused by ignoring the subgroup test of peer's DH-component (but still with the supergroup G ′ membership check) can be much relieved (and even waived), if the ephemeral private values generated within the protocol run are well-protected. More notes on the subgroup test, and on the ephemeral private values that can be exposed to adversary, are referred to Appendix D.
Advantageous Features of (s)OAKE
Efficiency advantages. The online computational complexity of (s)OAKE can remarkably be only 1 exponentiation at each player side (with embedded subgroup test), which is optimal for DHKE. Specifically, the value B dxt (resp., A cyt ) can be offline pre-computed byÂ (resp.,B). In comparison, (H)MQV cannot offline pre-compute the values B e and A d to improve online efficiency, and thus the online efficiency of (H)MQV is about 1.3 exponentiations. The total computational complexity of (s)OAKE is essentially the same as that of (H)MQV, with sOAKE being still slightly more efficient than HMQV. In particular, by the simultaneous exponentiation techniques [43, 30, 22] , each player in (H)MQV and (s)OAKE performs about 1.3 exponentiations in computing KÂ or KB. But, the computation of KÂ (resp., KB) of HMQV is still slightly more inefficient than that of sOAKE with a single hash. For example, to compute KÂ, besides the same other operations needed for simultaneous exponentiations, HMQV (resp., sOAKE) needs to compute {d, e, x + da, e(x + da)} (resp., only {e, a + xe}).
On the same subgroup order q, (s)OAKE ensures more robust resistance to collision attacks against the underlying hash function h than HMQV, as the output length of h, i.e., l, is set to be |q|/2 for HMQV but |q| for (s)OAKE. To strengthen its security, some standards specify larger subgroups (e.g., |q| = 255 in [50] ) to use for HMQV. However, in memory-restricted environments (like smart-cards or other portable electronic tokens), subgroup size is an influential parameter in favor of a given algorithmic solution.
Reasonable deniability. For key-exchange protocols, both security and privacy are desired, which would also have been being one of the major criteria underlying the evolution of a list of important industrial standards of DHKE (e.g., Internet key-exchange). Among privacy concerns, deniability is an essential privacy property, and has always been a central concern in personal and business communications, with off-the-record communication serving as an essential social and political tool [19, 20] . The reader is referred to [19, 20] for a list of scenarios where deniability is desirable. (Needless to say, there are special applications where non-repudiable communication is essential, but this is not the case for most of our nowaday communications over Internet [19, 20] where deniable authentication is much more desirable than non-repudiable authentication.)
A 2-round implicitly authenticated DHKE protocol is defined to be of reasonable deniability, if the session-key can be computed merely from the ephemeral DH-exponents without involving any player's static secret-key. Note that we cannot count on DHKE with implicit authentication, like (H)MQV and (s)OAKE, to enjoy full-fledged deniability (zero-knowledge). It is clear that (s)OAKE enjoys reasonable deniability, as the session-key of (s)OAKE can be computed merely from the DH-exponents x and y, which is useful to preserve privacy for both protocol players. Note that (H)MQV is not reasonably deniable, as the use of the session-key of (H)MQV can be traced back to the group of the two players particularly in view that the value g ab is involved in the session-key computation.
Modular, parallel and post-ID computability. First note that B dx , Y ca+ex and the explicit sub-group test Y q byÂ (resp., A cy , X db+ey and X q byB) can be computed in a parallel, modular and post-ID way, which allows for various trade-offs among security, privacy and efficiency for the deployment of (s)OAKE in practice. Specifically, the offline pre-computability of B dx and A cy eases more efficient explicit subgroup test by computing Y ca+ex and Y q (resp., X db+ey and X q ) in parallel that amounts to about 1.2 exponentiations. Also, as clarified, offline pre-computability of A cy (resp., B dx ) allows the above more robust Case-1 embedded subgroup test of X dbt+ext (resp., Y cat+ext ). Observe that, for OAKE, Y ca+ex (resp., X db+ey ) can be computed before learning peer's identity and publickey information. Such a post-ID computability, besides reasonable deniability, is useful for privacy preserving [15] . (H)MQV does not support such offline pre-computability and post-ID computability.
Ease deployment with lower-power devices. As we shall see in Section 4.2 and Appendix H.1, (s)OAKE (with offline pre-computation to an almost maximum extent) well supports the public computation model [39] (while (H)MQV does not), which is desirable for deploying KE protocols with authentication devices of limited computational ability in hostile computing environments. (s)OAKE allows smaller parameter |q| than HMQV (in resistance to collision attacks against h), which is important for deployment with memory-restricted devices (like smart-cards or other portable electronic tokens).
Minimal setup. (s)OAKE does not mandate proof of possession/knowledge (POP/K) of secret-key during public-key registration, while POP/K is now commonly assumed for MQV. POP/K is explicitly abandoned in HMQV, however as we shall see, there exists a way to maliciously asymmetrically compute the session-key of HMQV without knowing either static secret-key or ephemeral DH-exponent.
Security in the CK-Framework
At a high level, the design rationale of (s)OAKE is new, with NMJPOK as the core building tool. The design of MQV is based on implicit signatures [44] . The design of HMQV is based on Hashed Dual challenge-Response (HDR) signatures and Hashed Challenge-Response (HCR) signatures, which are in turn based on Dual Challenge-Response (DCR) and eXponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signatures. To further justify the robustness of the NMJPOK-based (s)OAKE protocols, we will show (in Section 5) that (s)OAKE can also be casted in terms of HDR signatures. Moreover, in comparison with the HDR signature implied by HMQV (referred to as HMQV-HDR), the HDR signatures implied by (s)OAKE, referred to as (s)OAKE-HDR/HCR, are both online efficient (i.e., only one online exponentiation) and strongly secure (by providing stronger secrecy exposure capability to the signature forger and posing more stringent forgery success condition).
In the CK-framework for a DHKE protocol, a concurrent man-in-the-middle (CMIM) adversary A controls all the communication channels among concurrent session runs of the KE protocol. In addition, A is allowed access to secret information via the following three types of queries: (1) state-reveal queries for ongoing incomplete sessions; (2) session-key queries for completed sessions; (3) corruption queries upon which all information in the memory of the corrupted parties will be leaked to A. A session (Â,B, X, Y ) is called exposed, if it or its matching session (B,Â, Y, X) suffers from any of these three queries. The session-key security (SK-security) within the CK-framework is captured as follows: for any complete session (Â,B, X, Y ) adaptively selected by A, referred to as the test session, as long as it is unexposed, with overwhelming probability it holds that (1) the session-key outputs of the test session and its matching session are identical; (2) A cannot distinguish the session-key output of the test session from a random value.
At a first glance, as (s)OAKE is of reasonable deniability (i.e., the session-key can be computed merely from x and y), (s)OAKE may not be secure in the CK-framework. However, this does not pose a problem for probable security within the CK-framework, where the test-session is required to be unexposed. Actually, as we shall see, the provable security of (s)OAKE within the CK-framework assumes much stronger secrecy exposure than HMQV. If one wants to sacrifice privacy for seemingly stronger security against exposure of both x and y even for the test-session, one can use the protocol variant of robust (s)OAKE proposed in Appendix C that is also provably secure in the CK-framework.
The only difference between robust (s)OAKE and (s)OAKE is that, the values KÂ and KB in robust (s)OAKE are set to be: KÂ = B a+xd Y ac+xe and KB = A b+yc X bd+ye . But, as discussed in Appendix E, the security advantage of robust (s)OAKE over (s)OAKE is insignificant, and from our view (s)OAKE achieves much better balance between security and privacy than the robust (s)OAKE variant.
For provable SK-security within the CK-framework, denote by (Â,B, X, Y ) the test-session, we show both OAKE and sOAKE (actually their weaker public-key free variants with players' public-keys removed from the inputs of c, d, e), with pre-computed and exposed DH-components, DH-exponents and the values A cy 's and B dx 's (which renders much stronger secrecy exposure capability to attacker than HMQV within the CK-framework), are SK-secure in the RO model, under the following assumptions (with proof details referred to Section 5 and Appendix G):
• The GDH assumption, in caseÂ =B (which is also the most often case in practice). We note that, whenever the DH-exponent is generated and exposed during a session-run without offline pre-computation prior to the session run, OR, there exists an honest player whose public DHcomponent for a session is offline pre-computed and exposed prior to the session run (no matter whether the secret DH-exponent is exposed or not), the security of HMQV is based on both the GDH assumption and the KEA assumption. That is, for this most often case ofÂ =B, (s)OAKE not only allows more powerful secrecy leakage but also is based on weaker assumptions than HMQV.
• The CDH assumption, in caseÂ =B and X = Y .
• The GDH assumption and the KEA assumption, in caseÂ =B and X = Y (the security of HMQV is based on the same assumptions in this case).
As stressed in [37] , security against exposed DH-exponents is deemed to be the main and prime concern for any robust DHKE, and security against exposed offline pre-computed values (particularly, the DHcomponents) is important to both lower-power devices and to high volume servers [37] . The reason is, as pointed out in [37] , many applications in practice will boost protocol performance by pre-computing and storing values for later use in the protocol. In this case, however, these stored values are more vulnerable to leakage, particularly when DHKE is deployed in hostile environments with plagued spyware or virus and in view of that the offline pre-computed DH-components are much less protected in practice as they are actually public values to be exchanged in plain. In addition, (s)OAKE enjoys the following security advantages: (1) tighter security reduction of sOAKE than HMQV (discussed in Appendix G.2 and G.3); (2) more robust embedded subgroup test supported by offline pre-computability of A cy and B dx (as clarified above); Due to space limitation, more discussions on the security of (s)OAKE vs. (H)MQV are given in Appendix E.
For (s)OAKE, putting public-keys into the input of c, d, e are necessary in order to ensure nonmalleable joint proof-of-knowledge of both (a, x) (resp., (b, y)) by playerÂ (resp.,B), as clarified with the development of (s)OAKE based on the underlying building tool of NMJPOK in Section 3 and Appendix B. But, as we shall see below (by concrete attacks), the SK-security in accordance with the CK-framework does not ensure joint proof-of-knowledge of (a, x) or (b, y). This is also the reason that we can prove the SK-security of (s)OAKE w.r.t. the public-key free variant. Next, we show that (s)OAKE also enjoys essential advantages over (H)MQV beyond the CK-framework.
Security Beyond the CK-Framework
A new perspective to DHKE: exponent-dependent attacks (EDA) on (H)MQV, and the introduction of computational fairness. In this work, we identify EDA attacks against (H)MQV, which causes computational unfairness between malicious users and honest users in the sense that an adversary can compute the shared DH-secret with an honest player in an asymmetric way. We then discuss the implications and damages caused by EDA attacks, and then introduce a new security notion called "computational fairness" for authenticated DHKE protocols.
Given a value X ∈ G for which the malicious playerÂ (e.g., a client) does not necessarily know the discrete logarithm of X,Â computes d and sets A = X −d −1 · g t where t ∈ Z q and d = h(X,B) for
the shared DH-secret now is KÂ = (XA d ) y+eb = g tdy g tdeb = Y td B tde . We call such an attack exponent dependent attack. If A sets t = 0 then the shared DH-secret KÂ is always 1 G . If A sets t = d −1 , then KÂ = Y B e . For all these two specific cases, the value KÂ can be publicly computed (without involving any secret values). In any case, the computational complexity in computing the shared DH-secret by the maliciousÂ is much lesser than that by its peerB, which clearly indicates some unfairness. In general, the maliciousÂ can honestly generate its public-key A = g a and compute the session-keys, thus explicitly requiring POP/K of secret-key during public-key registration and explicit key-confirmation and mutual authentication (as required by the 3-round (H)MQV) do not prevent the above attacks. As there are many choices of the value t by the adversary in different sessions, explicitly checking whether the shared DH-secret is Y B e also does not work. The above attacks can also be trivially modified (actually simplified) to be against the one-round HMQV variant. We stress that such attacks do not violate the security analysis of HMQV in [37] , as they are beyond the CK framework.
We note that MQV (with embedded subgroup membership test of peer's DH-component) explicitly checks the shared DH-secret is not 1 G , and thus the attack with t = 0 does not work against MQV. But, for (H)MQV with explicit subgroup tests of peer's public-key and DH-component, whether still checking the shared DH-secret is 1 G is however unspecified. In particular, the basic version of HMQV [37] does not check whether the shared DH-secret is 1 G or not, and POP/K of secret-keys is explicitly abandoned in HMQV. We also note the version of HMQV proposed in [38] does check and ensure the shared DH-secret is not 1 G . But, (H)MQV does not resist the above attacks with t = 0.
Besides asymmetric computation, such drawbacks also allow more effective DoS attacks. Though an adversary can send arbitrary messages to an honest party (say, playerB in the above attacks) to issue DoS attacks, which however can be easily detected by the authentication mechanism of (the 3-round version of) (H)MQV. But, with our above attacks, the honest playerB is hard to distinguish and detect an attack from an honest execution of (H)MQV.
This motivates us to introduce a new notion for DHKE, called session-key computational fairness. Roughly speaking, we say that a DHKE protocol enjoys session-key computational fairness, if the session-key computation (for any successfully finished session between a possibly malicious player and an honest player) involves the same number of non-malleably independent dominant-operation values for both the malicious player and the honest player. Here, dominant operation is specific to protocols, and for (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation is defined just to be modular exponentiation. Informally speaking, a set of dominant-operation values {V I 1 , · · · , V I m } for m ≥ 2 are non-malleably independent, if any polynomial-time malicious player I ∈ {Â,B} cannot make these values correlated under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation (no matter how the malicious player does). More formally, for any complete session-tag T ag, we say that a set of dominant-operation values {V I 1 , · · · , V I m } (w.r.t. T ag) are non-malleably independent, if they are indistinguishable from independent random values
We then show that (s)OAKE enjoys session-key computational fairness, while (H)MQV does not by the above concrete EDA attacks. We also propose some HMQV variants, just in the spirit of (s)OAKE and NMJPOK, to prevent our EDA attacks. The key point is to put A (resp., B) into the input of d (resp., e). Unfortunately, we failed in providing provable security of these fixing approaches in the CK-framework. In particular, we observed that it is hard to extend the security proof of HMQV [37] to any of the proposed fixing solutions (indeed, HMQV was very carefully designed to enjoy provable security in the CK-framework). Besides lacking provable security in the CK-framework, many other advantageous features enjoyed by (s)OAKE are also lost with these fixing solutions. To the best of our knowledge, we do not know how to achieve, besides the newly developed (s)OAKE family, implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols that enjoy all the following properties: (1) provable security in the CKframework; (2) online optimal (i.e., only one exponentiation) efficiency and/or reasonable deniability; (3) session-key computational fairness. The surrounding issues are quite subtle and tricky, and indeed (s)OAKE was very carefully designed to achieve all these features (and much more as clarified above). Due to space limitation, the reader is referred to Appendix F for more details.
On supporting the public computation model [39] . The work [39] proposed the public computation model for KE protocols, where an entity (performing a run of KE-protocol) is split into two parts: a trusted authentication device (which enforces the confidentiality of the authentication data), and an untrusted computing device (in which some computing operations are publicly carried out). This allows to use an authentication device with little computing power, and to make computing devices independent from users [39] . Some concrete applications suggested in [39] More discussions of the security of (s)OAKE beyond CK-framework are referred to Appendix H. The security of (s)OAKE, in the CK-framework and beyond, further justifies the soundness and robustness of the design rational and building tools of (s)OAKE.
Casting (s)OAKE in Terms of HDR Signatures
Informally speaking, to distinguish the session-key output of the unexposed test-session from a random value, an efficient adversary A only has two strategies in the RO model:
Key-replication attack. A succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session (other than the testsession or its matching session) that has the same session-key output as the test-session. In this case, A can learn the test-session key by simply querying the session to get the same key. Forging attack. At some point in its run, A queries the RO H K with the value KÂ or KB. This implies that A succeeds in outputting the value KÂ or KB.
At high level, the possibility of key-replication attack against (s)OAKE is ruled out unconditionally in the RO model by the NMJPOK and TBSS properties of (s)OAKE, which actually holds also for the public-key free variant of (s)OAKE (as matching sessions are defined without taking public-keys into account in the CK-framework). Below, we focus on ruling out the possibility of forging attack. Intuitively, by the NMJPOK property of (s)OAKE, an attacker can compute the DH-secret KÂ or KB of the test-session only if it does indeed "know" both the corresponding static secret-key and the ephemeral DH-exponent, which then violates the discrete logarithm assumption. But, turning this intuition into a formal proof needs introducing some non-standard non-black-box assumptions (though it much simplifies the security analysis), which may not be very favorable and is left to a subsequent separate work (for analyzing (s)OAKE in more security models). In this work, we mainly focus on the black-box analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework. In the rest, we show the forging attack can still be ruled out in a black-box manner, by casting (s)OAKE in terms of online-efficient and strongly secure HDR signatures. Full details (of this section) are given in Appendix G.
Informally speaking, a HDR signature scheme is an interactive signature scheme between two parties in the public-key model, with the dual roles of signer and challenger. ) We say a HDR signature scheme (ofB) is strongly secure, if no polynomial-time machine F can win the game in Figure 2 with non-negligible probability with respect to any uncorrupted partyÂ of public-key A = g a such that the secret-key a was not chosen by the attacker F.
More discussions on the above strong HDR unforgeability security definition and the comparisons between (s)OAKE-HDR and HMQV-HDR are referred to Appendix G.2. Due to space limitation, we only present the analysis sketch for OAKE-HDR here, the analysis for sOAKE-HDR is similar and actually much simpler. See Appendix G for full details.
Theorem 5.1 Under the GDH assumption, (public-key free) OAKE-HDR signatures ofB, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y, A cy ), are strongly secure in the random oracle model, with respect to any uncorrupted player other than the signerB itself even if the forger is given the private keys of all uncorrupted players in the system other than b ofB Proof (sketch of Theorem 5.1). The efficient solver C (who runs a supposed forger F as a subroutine) for the GDH problem is presented in Figure 3 (page 12) . It is easy to check, with overwhelming probability, the simulation of O is perfect in the RO model (with details referred to Appendix G).
Here, we only highlight the analysis of the probability that C aborts at step F3. In the RO model, except for some negligible probability, F cannot succeed with undefined c 0 , d 0 , e 0 . Also, F can guess the value r with negligible probability. The only left way for C to abort at step F3 is: r 0 is the value r set by C at one of S3.1 steps, where r is supposed to be H K (σ) w.r.t. a stored vector (Ẑ, Z, mẐ , mB, X, y, Y, Z cy , r). Recall that for the value r set at step S3.1, C does not know σ (as it does not know b), and thus in this case both C and F may not make the RO-query
In this case, except for some negligible probability, 
, where X 0 is the given random element in G \ 1 G ,Â and B are uncorrupted players. This is true, even if the public-key A (resp., B) is removed from c 0 (resp., d 0 ), as the public-keys A and B are generated by the uncorrupted playersÂ andB independently at random, and X 0 is the given random DH-component (not generated by the attacker).
Finally, by applying a slightly extended version of the forking lemma in [53] , which is referred to as divided forking lemma and is presented in Section G.1, we have that, provided that F succeeds with non-negligible probability in the first run of C, with non-negligible probability F will also succeed in the repeat experiment C1 or C2. In this case, the output of C is the just correct value of CDH(X 0 , B).
Now, we consider the case that the forger F is against the signerB itself (i.e.,Â =B). We further distinguish two cases: 
The key point is that, by performing the rewinding experiments, we cannot directly output the CDH(B, X 0 ), as we do not know the private key b ofB. Recall that, in this case, the uncorrupted player and the signer are the same.
We modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 as follows: the actions of C remain unchanged until the rewinding experiments; but C performs the rewinding experiments according to the order of the RO-queries c 0 , d 0 , e 0 . 
Note that, in this case, C does not rely on the KEA assumption for breaking the CDH assumption (but still with the DDH-oracle). 
. By the KEA assumption, it implies that F knows y 0 (which can be derived from the internal state of F). More formally, there exists an algorithm that, given B and X 0 and the random coins of C and F, can successfully output y 0 . Now, with the knowledge of y 0 , CDH(B, X 0 ) can be derived from σ 0 (or σ ′ 0 ). e 0 posterior to c 0 , d 0 . In this case, by rewinding F to the point of making the query e 0 = h(X 0 , Y 0 ), and redefines h(X 0 , Y 0 ) to be a new independent e ′ 0 , C will get
Then, by the KEA assumption, the knowledge of y 0 can be derived, with which CDH(X 0 , B) can then be computed Building the CDH solver C from the OAKE-HDR forger F Setup: The inputs to C are random elements U = g u , V = g v in G, and its goal is to compute CDH(U, V ) = g uv with oracle access to a DDH oracle O. To this end, C sets B = V and X0 = U , and sets the public-keys and secret-keys for all other uncorrupted players in the system. C runs the forger F on input (B, X0) against the signerB of public-key B. C provides F with a random tape, and provides the secret-keys of all uncorrupted players other than the signerB itself (the attacker F may register arbitrary public-keys for corrupted players, based on the public-keys and secret-keys of uncorrupted players). Signature query simulation: Each time F queriesB for a signature on values (Ẑ, Z, mB, mÂ), C answers the query forB as follows (note that C does not know b):
y and Z cy , where c = h(mẐ,Ẑ, Z, Y ) (that may be pre-defined, otherwise C defines c with the RO h). Actually, (y, Y, Z cy ) can be pre-computed by C and leaked to F prior to the session. Then, C responds (y, Y = g y , Z cy ) to F, and stores the vector (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, y, Y, A cy ) as an "incomplete session".
S2. F presents C with (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, Y ), and a challenge X.
S3.B checks that X ∈ G \ 1G (if not, it aborts) and that (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, Y ) is in one of its incomplete sessions (if not, it ignores the query). Then, C checks for every value σ ∈ G \ 1G previously used by F as input to HK whether σ = Z cy X bd+ye , where d = h(mB,B, B, X) and e = h(X, Y ) (in case d, e undefined, C defines them with h): it does so using the DDH-oracle O, specifically, by checking whether
If the answer is positive, then C sets r to the already determined value of HK(σ).
S3.1.
In any other cases, r is set to be a random value in {0, 1}
k , where k is the output length of HK. Note that, in this case, C does not know σ = Z cy X db+ey , as it does not know b, which also implies that C does not make (actually realize) the RO-query HK (σ) even if the value σ has been well-defined and known to F. RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracles h and HK (made by F), under the limitation that if the same RO-query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as in the first time. But, for each new query σ to HK, C checks whether σ = Z cy X db+ey for any one of the stored vectors (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, X, y, Y, Z cy , r) (as before, this check is done using the DDH-oracle). If equality holds then the corresponding r is returned as the predefined HK(σ), otherwise a random r is returned. Upon F's termination. When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold:
F1. F outputs a valid HDR-signature (Â, A, m1, m0, X0, Y0, r0), whereÂ =B is an uncorrupted player. In particular, it implies that r0 should be HK(σ0), where σ0 = A y 0 c 0 X 
F3
. The values c0 = h(m1,Â, A, Y0), d0 = h(m0,B, B, X0) and e0 = h(X0, Y0) were queried from the RO h, and the value HK(σ0) was queried from HK being posterior to the queries c0, d0, e0. Otherwise, C aborts.
If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the "repeat experiments" below, else it aborts.
The repeat experiments. C runs F again for a second time, under the same input (B, X0) and using the same coins for F. 
−1 , where a and a ′ are the private keys of the uncorruptedÂ andÂ ′ (different fromB, which are assumed to be known to C). Note that (Â ′ , A ′ , m 
, and then
Figure 3: Reduction from GDH to OAKE-HDR forgeries
After establishing the strong unforgeability security of (s)OAKE-HDR, similar to the analysis of HMQV, the analysis of (s)OAKE within the CK-framework is quite straightforward and less interesting. In particular, the special structure of sOAKE-HDR also much simplifies the security analysis of sOAKE by only using the standard forking lemma [53] , and tightens the security reductions. Full details are referred to Appendix G.3.
A Variants of (H)MQV
Three-round HMQV (resp., MQV) adds key confirmation as follows: 0) , B uses K m as the MAC key to authenticate 0 (resp., (2,B,Â, Y, X)) in the second-round of HMQV (resp., MQV); andÂ uses K m to authenticate 1 (resp., (3,Â,B, X, Y )) in an additional third-round of HMQV (resp., MQV). The session-key is set to be K = H K (KÂ, 1) = H K (KB, 1).
In one-round HMQV, onlyÂ sends X, and the session-key is derived as follows:
B NMJPOK: Motivation, Formulation, and Implementations
We consider an adversarial setting, where polynomially many instances (i.e., sessions) of a Diffie-Hellman protocol Â ,B are run concurrently over an asynchronous network like the Internet. To distinguish concurrent sessions, each session run at the side of an uncorrupted player is labeled by a tag, which is the concatenation, in the order of session initiator and then session responder, of players' identities/publickeys and DH-components available from the session transcript. A session-tag is complete if it consists of a complete set of all these components.
In this work, we study the mechanisms for non-malleably and jointly proving the knowledge of both b and y w.r.t. a challenge DH-component X between the proverB (of public-key B = g b and DH-component Y = g y ) and the verifierÂ (who presents the challenge DH-component X = g x ), where b, y, x ∈ Z * q . In particular, we investigate joint proof-of-knowledge (JPOK) of the type JP OK (b,
in the random oracle model, where f h 0 and f h 1 are some functions from {0, 1} * to G \ 1 G with oracle access to an RO h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , aux 0 and aux 1 are some public values. Moreover, we look for solutions of JP OK (b,y) such that JP OK (b,y) can be efficiently computed with one single exponentiation by the knowledge prover. Note that the tag for a complete session of JP OK (b,y) is (Â,B, B, X, Y ). The possibility of NMJPOK without ROs (based upon pairings) is left to be studied in a subsequent separate paper. In the rest of this paper, we denote by the output length, i.e., l, of h as the security parameter. . The key point here is that the values db and ey are not necessarily independent. A series of careful investigations bring us to the following principles for proving DH knowledges non-malleably and jointly:
Inside Computational Independence.
The key principle is: the inside multiplied components F 0 and F 1 of JP OK (b,y) should be computationally independent, no matter how a malicious knowledge proverB (of public-key B = g b ∈ G) does. That is, the adversarial attempts at Z δ for any δ ∈ {0, 1} should be essentially sealed (i.e., localized) to F δ , and are isolated (i.e., "independent") from the adversarial attempts at Z 1−δ . This essentially ensures that no matter how the possibly malicious knowledge-proverB does, to compute JP OK (b,y)B has to compute two "independent" DH-secrets F 0 and F 1 w.r.t. the fresh challenge X, which implies thatB does indeed "know" both b and y.
Definition B.1 (computational independence) We formulate two types of "computational independence" w.r.t. JP OK (b,y) :
(1) Self-sealed computational independence. Given arbitrary values (α, β) ∈ (G \ 1 G ) 2 , no matter how a maliciousB does, both Pr[F 0 = α] and Pr[F 1 = β] are negligible.
(2) Committed computational independence. There exists δ ∈ {0, 1} such that for any α ∈ G \ 1 G Pr[F δ = α] is negligible, no matter how a maliciousB does. This captures the independence of F δ on F 1−δ , i.e., the infeasibility of adversarial attempts by a malicious prover on setting F δ to be correlated to F 1−δ ; On the other hand, the value F 1−δ is committed to F δ , in the sense that
, no efficient algorithm can provide, with non-negligible probability,
That is, any adversarial attempt by a malicious prover on setting F 1−δ to be correlated to a given value F δ , by changing
for example, by simply changing B for the case of δ = 1 or Y for the case of δ = 0), will cause the value F δ itself changed that in turn determines and commits to the value F 1−δ (while Pr[F δ = α] is negligible for any α ∈ G \ 1 G ). This implies the infeasibility of adversarial attempt on setting F 1−δ to be correlated to F δ , i.e., the "computational independence" of F 1−δ on F δ . The probabilities are taken over the random coins used by the maliciousB and the honestÂ, and the choice of the random function h in the RO model.
Informally speaking, the underlying rationale of N M JP OK (b,y) is: given a random challenge X, no matter how a maliciousB chooses the values Y = g y and B = g b (where the values y and b can be arbitrarily correlated), it actually has no control over the values db and ey in the RO model. That is, by the birthday paradox it is infeasible for a maliciousB to set db (resp., ey) to some predetermined value with non-negligible probability in the RO model (in order to make the values db and ey correlated). Alternatively speaking, given a random challenge X, (by the birthday paradox) it is infeasible for a maliciousB to output B = g b and Y = g y such that the values db and ey satisfy some predetermined (polynomial-time computable) relation with non-negligible probability in the RO model.
The situation with sN M JP OK (b,y) is a bit different. Though as in N M JP OK (b,y) , the malicious proverB is infeasible to set ey to a predetermined value,B can always set the value db = b at its wish as d = 1 for sN M JP OK (b,y) . But,B is still infeasible to set the value b correlated to ey = h(B, X, Y )y, particularly because the value B is put into the input of e. Specifically, for any value B (that determines the value b) set byB, with the goal of making b and ey correlated, the probability that the values ey = h(B, X, Y )y and b satisfy some predetermined (polynomial-time computable) relation is negligible in the RO model (again by the birthday paradox). In particular, the probability that Pr[b = f (ey)] or Pr[f (b) = ey], where f is some predetermined polynomial-time computable function (that is in turn determined by some predetermined polynomial-time computable relation), is negligible in the RO model, no matter how the maliciousB does.
Outside Non-Malleability. As JPOK may be composed with other protocols in practice, another principle is that the JPOK provided by one party in a session should be bounded to that session, in the sense that the JPOK should not be malleated into or from other sessions. This is captured by the following definition, which particularly implies the property of "key control" [40] for DHKE.
Definition B.2 (tag-binding self-seal (TBSS))
For a DH protocol in the RO model, denote by Z T ag the random variable of the shared DH-secret in G (say, JPOK or session-key) determined by a complete session-tag T ag (taken over the choice of the random function h in the RO model). We say it is tagbinding self-sealed, if for any α ∈ G \ 1 G and any complete T ag,
where l is the security parameter. The probability is taken over the choice of the random function h in the RO model.
The definition of TBSS particularly implies that: given an arbitrary yet complete session-tag T ag, by the birthday paradox no efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm can, with non-negligible probability, output a different T ag ′ = T ag such that Z T ag ′ and Z T ag collide in the sense Z T ag ′ = Z T ag in the RO model assuming h is a random function. In more detail, by the birthday paradox, the probability that an efficient algorithm finds two colliding tags (T ag, T ag ′ ) such that
where T = poly(l) is the running time of the algorithm. In a sense, the DH-secret determined by a complete session-tag is "bounded" to this specific session, and is essentially "independent" of the outside world composed concurrently with the current session. In particular, the shared DH-secret is random and unpredictable.
TBSS vs. contributiveness. The work [3] introduced the notion of "contributiveness" property for password-authenticated group key exchange protocols, which roughly says that the distributions of session-keys are guaranteed to be random, as long as there are enough honest players in a session. We noted that our TBSS definition, originally presented in [1, 2] independently of [3] , has similar security guarantee. As we shall see, (H)MQV lacks the TBSS property by the EDA attacks presented in Section 4.2, which implies also that the TBSS property is not captured by the CK-framework.
We say that JP OK (b,y) is a non-malleable joint proof-of-knowledge (NMJPOK), of the knowledges (b, y) w.r.t. the random DH-component challenge X, if JP OK (b,y) satisfies both the above two principles.
Preferable candidates for NMJPOK. Guided by the above principles, we propose two preferable solutions for NMJPOK in the RO model:
• Self-sealed JPOK (SSJPOK): SSJP OK (b,y) = X db+ey , where d = h(Â,B, B, X) and e = h(X, Y ); Specifically, aux 0 = {Â,B, B, X} and 0 ) and
is a hash function and l ≈ |q| (in the unlikely case that h(x) = 0 for some x, the output of h(x) can be defined by default to be a value in Z * q − {0, 1} l ).
• Single-hash SSJPOK (sSSJPOK): sSSJP OK (b,y) = X db+ey , where d = 1 and e = h(Â,B, B, X, Y );
Specifically, aux 0 is empty and
Needless to say, there are other NMJPOK candidates (e.g., d = h(B, X) and e = h(Â,B, X, Y ), or d = h(Â,B, B, X, Y ) and e = h(Y, X,B,Â), etc). But the above explicitly proposed solutions enjoy the following advantageous properties, which make them more desirable:
• Post-ID, modular and offline computability of SSJPOK. Specifically, as the input of e does not includeÂ's identity and public-key,Â can first send X without revealing its identity information. In this case,B can first compute X ey , and then X db only after learningÂ's identity and public-key. Also, without inputting Y into d allowsÂ to pre-compute B dx (= X db ) prior to the protocol run.
• sSSJPOK is preferable because of its offline computability, more efficient computational complexity and the less use of hash function h. It is quite straightforward to check that, in the RO model, SSJPOK (resp., sSSJPOK) satisfies self-sealed (resp., committed) computational independence, and both of them are tag-binding selfsealed. In more details, for SSJPOK, for any given values (B, Y ) (which determine (b, y)) output by a malicious proverB and any valueβ ∈ Z * q Pr[db =β] (resp., Pr[ey =β]) is constant: either 0 or
in the RO model (no matter how a malicious proverB does). The committed computational independence of sSSJPOK is from the observation: {X, B} (that determines F 0 = X b ) are committed to F 1 = X yh(aux 1 ) in the RO model as {X, B} ⊆ aux 1 . The TBSS property of (s)SSJPOK can be derived by a straightforward calculation. Proof details that (s)SSJPOK are NMJPOK in the RO model are given below.
Proposition B.1 SSJPOK is NMJPOK in the RO Model.
Proof. We first prove the self-sealed computational independence of SSJPOK in the RO model. Note that for SSJPOK, 2 ) and any pair of given values α = gα, β = gβ ∈ (G \ 1 G ) 2 , whereα,β ∈ Z * q , we consider the set of values that F 0 can be assigned in the RO model
and also the set of values that F 1 can be assigned in the RO model
) in the RO model. As the malicious proverB is polynomial-time, we have that, no matter the polynomial-time maliciousB does on a challenge X, the probability that it outputs B, Y such that F 0 = α and F 1 = β is negligible. Specifically, suppose N = 2 l − 1 and T = poly(l) is the running time ofB, by the birthday paradox the probability that on input (X, α, β) the maliciousB outputs (B, Y ) such that F 0 = α or F 1 = β is at most
that is negligible (in l). Next we prove the TBSS property of SSJPOK in the RO model, which is based on and can be easily derived from the NMJPOK property of OAKE. For a complete session of SSJP OK, its tag is:
where b, x, y ∈ Z * q , we consider the value Z T ag = X db+ey = X h(Â,B,B,Y )b · X h(X,Y )y in the RO model where h is assumed to be a random oracle. As for each value Proof. We first show the committed computational independence property of sSSJPOK. Similar to the analysis of Proposition B.1, for the case δ = 1 we have that for any given α ∈ G \ 1 G and any DHcomponent challenge X, and any (B,
in the RO model, where δ = 1. As the maliciousB is polynomial-time, we have the probability that the maliciousB outputs (B, Y ), given a random challenge X and a given value α ∈ G \ 1 G , such that F 1 = α is negligible in the RO model. 2 Then, the committed computational independence of sSSJPOK is from the following observation that X b is committed to X yh (Â,B,B,X,Y ) . Specifically,
is determined by S 0 = {X, B} (resp., aux 1 = {Â,B, B, X, Y }), and aux 0 is empty for sSSJPOK.
• Given Z δ = Z 1 = X y and aux δ = aux 1 = {Â,B, B, X, Y }, for any B ′ = B such that
. Thus for any polynomial-time algorithm, the probability that it, on in- 
C Some Variants of (s)OAKE
One-round OAKE (oOAKE): The playerÂ sends X = g x toB. Normally,Â is a client machine andB is a server machine. Let KÂ = B a+ex and KB = A b X eb , where e = h(Â, A,B, B, X) and the session-key is K = H K (KÂ) = H K (KB). For oOAKE, it is also recommend to set the output length of h to be shorter, e.g., |q|/2, to ease the computation of KB = A b X eb = (AX e ) b in some application scenarios (e.g., when the pre-computation of A b is inconvenient).
Note that the computational complexity ofÂ is 2 exponentiations in total and all the computation ofÂ can be offline. To improve the on-line efficiency ofB, the playerB can pre-compute A b in an off-line way (and store it in a database entry corresponding to the clientÂ), and only on-line computes X eb and X q which amounts to about 1.2 exponentiations (it is recommended forB to explicitly check the subgroup membership of X). In case of embedded subgroup test,B should explicitly check X ∈ G ′ and X ebt = 1 G (only checking KB = 1 G is not sufficient to prevent the small subgroup attack). We remind that oOAKE intrinsically suffers from the key compromise impersonation (KCI) vulnerability in caseB's static secret-key b is compromised, and lacks perfect forward secrecy (the same vulnerabilities hold also for one-round variant of HMQV).
Robust (s)OAKE: The only difference between robust (s)OAKE and (s)OAKE is that, the values KÂ and KB in robust (s)OAKE are set to be: KÂ = B a+xd Y ac+xe and KB = A b+yc X bd+ye . Specifically, the values KÂ and KB in OAKE and sOAKE are now multiplied with the value g ab in robust OAKE and robust sOAKE.
We show in Appendix G.2.1 that the provable security of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework can be easily extended to robust (s)OAKE under the same complexity assumptions.
Adding (explicit) mutual authentication. For adding mutual authentication to (s)OAKE, besides the session-key K we also need a MAC-key K m to be used within the protocol run (but erased after the protocol run). Both the session-key and MAC-key are derived from the shared DH-secret KÂ = KB, and are independent in the random oracle model. For (s)OAKE with mutual authentication, B sends an additional value t B = M AC Km (1) in the second-round, andÂ sends t A = M AC Km (0) in an additional third-round. For oOAKE with mutual authentication, the playerÂ can additionally send t A = M AC Km (0) in the first-round, and the playerB responds back M AC Km (1) in the subsequent round. In practice, the message authentication code MAC can be instantiated with HMAC [6] .
D More Discussions on the Specification of (s)OAKE
Subgroup test vs. ephemeral DH-exponent leakage. We note that the damage caused by ignoring the subgroup test of peer's DH-component (but still with the supergroup G ′ membership check) can be much relieved (and even waived), if the ephemeral private values generated within the protocol run are well-protected. For example, even if an adversary learns some partial information about db + ey by issuing a small subgroup attack against the honestB (by setting X to be in a small subgroup), it still cannot derive the value b without compromising the ephemeral value y. Also note that the adversary actually cannot derive the full value of db + ey by small subgroup attacks, as the DH-exponent y is independent at random in each session. In this case, we suggest that embedded subgroup test is sufficient. For presentation simplicity and unity, in the rest of this paper, it is assumed that t = N q for implementations with embedded subgroup test, and t = 1 with explicit subgroup test.
Ephemeral private values exposable to adversary. The ephemeral private values exposable to adversary, generated by the honestB (resp.,Â) during the protocol run, are specified to be: y (resp., x) ifB (resp.,Â) does not pre-compute A cy (resp., B dx ), or (y, A cy ) (resp., (x, B dx )) ifB (resp., A) pre-computes A cy (resp., B dx ). Other ephemeral private values are erased promptly after use. We remark all ephemeral private values, except for the session-key in case the session is successfully finished, generated by an honest party within the protocol run are erased after the session is completed (whether finished or aborted). For expired sessions, the session-keys are also erased.
E More Discussions on the Security of (s)OAKE vs. HMQV
Assuming all the DH-components generated by all uncorrupted players are not exposed to the attacker prior to the sessions involving them (e.g., all honest players only generate fresh ephemeral DHcomponents on the fly, i.e., without pre-computation, in each session), and assuming all the ephemeral DH-exponents generated during session runs are unexposed to the attacker, the SK-security of HMQV can be based on the CDH assumption, while we do not know how to prove this property with (s)OAKE. This is the only advantage of HMQV over (s)OAKE that we can see.
However, as already stressed in [37] , security against exposed DH-exponents is deemed to be the main and prime concern for any robust DHKE, and security against exposed offline pre-computed values (particularly, the DH-components) is important to both lower-power devices and to high volume servers [37] . The reason is, as pointed out in [37] , many applications in practice will boost protocol performance by pre-computing and storing values for later use in the protocol. In this case, however, these stored values are more vulnerable to leakage, particularly when DHKE is deployed in hostile environments with plagued spyware or virus and in view of that the offline pre-computed DH-components are much less protected in practice as they are actually public values to be exchanged in plain.
Also, for DHKE protocols running concurrently in settings like the Internet, we suggest it is unreasonable or unrealistic to assume non-precomputation and non-exposure of the public DH-components for all uncorrupted parties in the system. Note that, whenever there is an uncorrupted player whose DH-component is exposed prior to the session in which the DH-component is to be used (the attacker can just set this session as the test-session), the security of HMQV relies on both the GDH assumption and the KEA assumption in most cases as clarified in Section 4.1.
For the above reasons, we suggest that the security advantage of HMQV over (s)OAKE in this special case is insignificant in reality. Note that, even in this special case, (s)OAKE enjoys other security advantages: (1) stronger embedded subgroup test supported by offline pre-computability of A cy and B dx ; (2) resistance to more powerful secrecy exposure of the additional pre-computed private values A cy and B dx ; (3) stronger resistance against collision attacks on the underlying hash function h; (4) tighter security reduction of sOAKE. Further note that, in the case of pre-computed and exposed DH-components, (s)OAKE is based upon weaker assumptions (i.e., only the GDH assumption) than (H)MQV (that is based on both the GDH assumption and the KEA assumption) for the most often case ofÂ =B.
(s)OAKE vs. robust (s)OAKE. Note that, in comparison with (s)OAKE that enjoys reasonable deniability, the variant of robust (s)OAKE proposed in Appendix C loses the reasonable deniability property. But, it seems that robust (s)OAKE may render seemingly stronger security, in the sense that even both the ephemeral DH-exponents x and y are exposed by an adversary the adversary still cannot compute the DH-secret KÂ or KB. We suggest that such a security advantage of robust (s)OAKE over the plain (s)OAKE is not significant, based on the following observation:
• If we assume a powerful adversary that can expose both ephemeral DH-exponents x and y for the test session, then it may also be reasonable to assume that the adversary can expose one of the values (KÂ, KB) for that exposed session. Note that, from (x, y) and one of the values (KÂ, KB), the adversary can compute the value g ab . As the value g ab is fixed and used in all sessions, once the value g ab is gotten the adversary can compute the session-key for all other sessions with exposed both ephemeral DH-exponents.
In the CK-framework, the test-session and its matching session (in case the matching session exists) are assumed to be unexposed. That is, in the CK-framework, the adversary is only allowed to exposed ephemeral DH-exponents (and maybe other private values) for sessions other than the test-session and its matching session. Actually, as we show in Appendix G, (s)OAKE is secure in the CK-framework assuming exposed DH-exponents (x, y) and off-line computed values (A cy , B dx ).
Based on the above observations, we suggest (s)OAKE achieves much better balance between security and privacy than robust (s)OAKE.
F Formulation and Analysis of (Session-Key) Computational Fairness
In Section 4.2, we introduced the new perspective of "computational fairness" for DHKE by concrete EDA attacks against (H)MQV, and showed that computational unfairness can cause some essential security damages to DHKE protocols. We now consider how to formulate "computational fairness" for DHKE protocols. A first thought is to require that, to successfully finish a session (with session-key output) with an honest player (e.g., playerB), the computation of the malicious player (e.g.,Â) and that of its honest peer should have the same computational complexity. But, such a formulation is imprecise and does not work. With (s)OAKE as an example, the honest playerB has two ways to compute KB = A cy X db+ye : one way is to use the simultaneous exponentiation techniques, which amounts to about 1.3 exponentiations; and another way is to compute two separate exponentiations A cy (that can be offline computed) and X db+ey and then multiply them to get KB. Moreover, there exist a number of different methods for simultaneous exponentiations with (slightly) varying computational complexity [43, 30, 22] . Thus, simply requiring the computational complexity of a malicious player and that of its honest peer to be the same is meaningless in general.
In this work, we focus on session-key computational fairness, i.e., the computational fairness in computing the session-key, for implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols like (H)MQV and (s)OAKE as are the focus of this work (extension to general interactive protocols is discussed later). For any complete session-tag (e.g., T ag = (Â, A,B, B, X, Y ) here for (H)MQV and (s)OAKE)) and I ∈ {Â,B}, we first identify dominant-operation values w.r.t. T ag and I, (V I 1 , · · · , V I m I ) ∈ G 1 × · · · × G m I , m I ≥ 2, which are specified to compute the session-key K by honest player I ∈ {Â,B} for a complete session of DHKE specified by the complete session-tag T ag, where
where K is the session-key output, F K is some polynomial-time computable function (that is defined by the session-key computation specified for honest players). The dominantoperation values of a complete session are random variables defined over the complete session-tag (as well as the choice of the random function in the RO model). We remark that dominant operations are specific to protocols, where for different key-exchange protocols the dominant operations can also be different. For (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation is defined just to be modular exponentiation. Then, roughly speaking, we say that a DHKE protocol enjoys session-key computational fairness, if for any complete session-tag T ag, the session-key computation involves the same number of non-malleably independent dominant-operation values for both I ∈ {Â,B}. Here, "non-malleable independence" is defined in reminiscent of Definition B.1. Specifically, we consider two notions of "non-malleably independence".
Definition F.1 (strong non-malleable independence) For the dominant-operation values,
and I ∈ {Â,B}, w.r.t. a complete session-tag T ag on any sufficiently large security parameter n, we say V I 1 , · · · , V I m I are strongly computationally (resp., perfectly) non-malleably independent, if for any polynomial-time computable (resp., any power unlimited) relation/algorithm R (with components drawn from G 1 × · · · × G m I × {0, 1} * ) it holds that the following quantity is negligible in n (resp., just 0):
where U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m I is taken uniformly at random from G i , and the probability is taken over the random coins of R (as well as the choice of the random function in the random oracle model).
Remark: Note that the above Definition F.1 is defined w.r.t. any complete session-tag, which does not explicitly take the malicious player's ability into account. But, this definition ensures that, by the birthday paradox, for any successfully finished session between a malicious player (e.g., player I =B) and an honest player (e.g., playerÂ), no matter how the malicious player does (on the identity and DH-challenge of the honest player, i.e., (A, X)), it holds that: for any (α 1 , · · · , α m I ) ∈ (G \ 1 G ) m I , the probability that Pr[V I i = α i ] is negligible for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m I . The reason is: for each concrete choice of (B, Y ) byB (which then determines a complete session-tag), the distribution of the values (V I 1 , · · · , V I m I ) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. As the malicious player is polynomialtime (i.e., can make at most polynomial number of choices), by the birthday paradox it holds that the malicious player can set V I i to be a predetermined value only with negligible probability. This means that the malicious player cannot make the values (V I 1 , · · · , V I m I ) maliciously correlated (under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation) with non-negligible probability. In this sense, the notion of "self-sealed computational independence" in accordance with Definition B.1 (which is defined specific to NMJPOK for proving the joint knowledge of b and y w.r.t. a single DH-challenge X) can be viewed as a special and weaker case of strong non-malleable independence defined here.
Definition F.2 (general non-malleable independence) For the dominant-operation values,
and I ∈ {Â,B}, w.r.t. a complete session-tag T ag on any sufficiently large security parameter n, we say V I 1 , · · · , V I m I are generally computationally (resp., perfectly) non-malleably independent, if there exists at most one j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m I such that for any polynomial-time computable (resp., any power unlimited) relation/algorithm R (with components drawn from G 1 × · · · × G m I × {0, 1} * ) it holds that the following quantity is negligible in n (resp., just 0):
where U i , 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m I is taken uniformly at random from G i , and the probability is taken over the random coins of R (as well as the choice of the random function in the random oracle model).
Remark: The definition of general non-malleable independence says that the distribution of (V I 1 , · · · ,
As the values (U 1 , · · · , U j−1 , V I j , U j+1 , · · · , U m I ) are mutually independent, it then implies that the values of (
) are also computationally independent. This definition also ensures that, no matter how a malicious polynomial-time player I ∈ {Â,B} does, (by the birthday paradox) it holds that: (1) The malicious player cannot make the values (V I 1 , · · · , V I j−1 , V I j+1 , · · · , V I m I ) correlated to V I j under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation. In particular, for any
(2) Any efforts of the malicious player in order to change the value V I j (which then changes the session-tag)
will cause all other values (V I 1 , · · · , V I j−1 , V I j+1 , · · · , V I m I ) changed (to some values indistinguishable from random ones). Thus, the malicious player is also infeasible to set the value V I j correlated to any of the values (V I 1 , · · · , V I j−1 , V I j+1 , · · · , V I m I ). This also further implies that the value V I j is committed to V I i for any i, 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m I , in the sense that: the malicious player cannot (with non-negligible probability by the birthday paradox) output two different session tags on which the values V I j are different but the value V I i remains the same. In this sense, the notion of "committed computational independence" in accordance with Definition B.1 (which is defined specific to sNMJPOK) can be viewed as a special and weaker case of general non-malleable independence defined here. Finally, it is direct that strong non-malleable independence is stronger than general non-malleable independence.
Definition F.3 ((session-key) computational fairness)
We say a DHKE protocol has session-key computational fairness, if for any complete session-tag T ag on any sufficiently large security parameter n, the session-key computation involves the same number of non-malleably independent dominantoperation values for any I ∈ {Â,B}. That is, for any complete session-tag T ag on sufficiently large security parameter and for each player I ∈ {Â,B}, it holds that: (1) the dominant-operation values
w.r.t. T ag, involved in computing the session-key via
, T ag), are (strong or general) non-malleably independent, and (2) mÂ = mB, where F K is some predetermined polynomialtime computable function specified to compute session-key (according to protocol specification).
Remark: Though session-key computational fairness is defined w.r.t. any complete session tag, according to the discussions following Definition F.1 and Definition F.3, it particularly ensures that: for any polynomial-time malicious player I, no matter how it does, (by the birthday paradox) it is infeasible to make the values
(involved in session-key computation) correlated under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation. Note that we used the number of non-malleably independent dominant-operation values involved in session-key computation as the measurement for session-key computational fairness. The reason we require the dominant-operation values to be nonmalleably independent is that, without such a requirement, as shown by our EDA attacks on (H)MQV, an adversary can potentially set these values maliciously correlated such that the session-key can be computed much more easily (than the ways specified for honest players) even without knowing any of the dominant-operation values. The reason we only require the dominant-operation values involved (rather than computed) in session-key computation is that, there can be multiple different ways to compute the session-key from dominant-operation values. With the function F K (V 1 , V 2 ) = H K (V 1 ·V 2 ) as an example, where V 1 and V 2 are non-malleably independent, one can compute two separate exponentiations V 1 and V 2 and then compute the session-key, but one can also use the simultaneous exponentiations technique to compute V 1 · V 2 with only about 1.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, there are a number of different methods for simultaneous exponentiations with (slightly) varying computational complexities. But, with any computation way, the value of
has to be computed, with which two non-malleably independent exponentiations are involved.
Remark: We note that the issue of computational fairness can apply to interactive protocols in general, as long as the honest players have the same computational operations under protocol specifications. 3 For implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols like (H)MQV and (s)OAKE, we only considered here the session-key computational fairness. In general, for key-exchange protocols with explicit authentication (e.g., via signatures and/or MACs), besides session-key computational fairness, we need also consider authentication computational fairness. The formulation of session-key computational fairness is also instrumental in formulating authentication computational fairness, which is beyond the scope of this work.
Proposition F.1 (s)OAKE is session-key computationally fair assuming h : {0, 1} * → G \ 1 G is a random oracle, while (H)MQV is not session-key computationally fair.
Proof. For both (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation (involved in session-key computation) is defined to be modular exponentiation. A complete session-tag consists of (Â,
For (s)OAKE and any complete session-tag T ag, the dominant operation values specified for the playerÂ (resp.,B) are VÂ 1 = B dx ∈ G \ 1 G and VÂ 2 = Y ca+ex ∈ G \ 1 G (resp., VB 1 = A cy and VB 2 = X db+ey ), where c = h (Â, A, Y ), d = h(B, B, X) , e = h(X, Y ) (resp., c = d = 1 and e = h(Â, A,B, B, X, Y )) for OAKE (resp., sOAKE). The function F K is specified to be
. It is clear that, similar to the analysis of Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, the distribution of (V I 1 , V I 2 ), for both I ∈ {Â,B}, is identical to that of (U 1 , U 2 ) for OAKE (resp., (V I 1 , U 2 ) for sOAKE) in the random oracle model, where U i , i ∈ {1, 2} is taken uniformly at random from G \ 1 G . That is, (V I 1 , V I 2 ) are strongly perfect non-malleably independent for OAKE (resp., generally perfect non-malleably independent for sOAKE). Thus, both OAKE and sOAKE enjoy session-key computational fairness.
For (H)MQV and any complete session-tag T ag, the dominant operation values specified for the playerÂ (resp.,B) are VÂ 1 = Y x+da ∈ G and VÂ 2 = B e(x+da) ∈ G (resp., VB 1 = X y+eb and VB 2 = A d(y+eb) ), where d = h(X,B), e = h(Y,Â) for HMQV (resp., d = 2 l + (X mod 2 l ) and e = 2 l + (Y mod 2 l ) for MQV). The function F K is specified to be
Our concrete EDA attacks presented in Section 4.2 demonstrate that both MQV and HMQV do not satisfy computational fairness. Specifically, consider the following specific relations (corresponding to the two specific cases of our attack): 
Remark: By the session-key computational fairness property of (s)OAKE, the session-key computation involves two non-malleably independent values A cy and X db+ey no matter how a maliciouŝ B does (i.e.,B is infeasible to make the values A cy and X db+ey correlated under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation). If we view each non-malleably independent exponentiation value as a proof-of-knowledge of the corresponding exponent, then to compute the session-key any PPT player has to "know" both cy and db + ey, from which both the static secret-key b and the ephemeral DHexponent y can be efficiently derived. In this sense, the session-key computation of (s)OAKE itself can be viewed as a non-malleable join proof-of-knowledge of both b and y. This further implies that a malicious player is infeasible to set the session-key to some values that can be publicly computed from the session transcript.
Comparisons with the fairness notions in secure multi-party computation (SMC). The notion of "fairness" was intensively studied in the literature of secure multi-party computation (see [28] for an overview of the various fairness notions considered in SMC). Informally speaking, a protocol is fair if either all the parties learn the output of the function, or no party learns anything (about the output). This property is also referred to as "complete fairness" (along with many variants), which mainly deals with prematurely adversarial aborting. To bypass some impossibility results on achieving fair SMC protocols with a majority of corrupted players, the work [26] introduced the notion of "resource fair SMC". The resource fairness considered in [26] is still a variant of "complete fairness". Specifically, the "resource fairness" [26] captures "fairness through gradual release". Here, protocols using gradual release consist of a "computation" phase, where some computation is carried out, followed by a "revealing" phase, where the parties gradually release their private information towards learning the protocol output. Then, roughly speaking, resource fairness requires that the honest players and the adversary run essentially the same number of steps in order to obtain protocol output.
Casting "fairness through gradual release" into DHKE, it means that: playersÂ andB gradually release their DH-exponents X and Y in sequential steps, so that both parties can output the session-key or both cannot. Clearly, the notions of "complete fairness" and "resource fairness" considered in the literature of SMC are significantly different from the session-key computational fairness formulated and considered in this work. Specifically, we assume both parties honestly send their DH-exponents, and computational fairness is about the session-key computation complexity. That is, our computational fairness is to capture the fairness between non-aborting players in computing session-key outputs (i.e., if both players do not abort, they should invest essentially the same computational resources in computing the session-key output), while "complete fairness" and its variant in the literature of SMC mainly deal with prematurely adversarial aborting. Also, the resource fairness considered in [26] is relative to experiment in which the protocol is run or the protocol needs to be aware of the computational power of the adversary (up to a constant) [26] .
F.1 On Fixing HMQV to Achieve Computational Fairness
In [2, 1] , we proposed some variants of (H)MQV, just in the spirit of (s)OAKE and NMJPOK to prevent our EDA attacks and to render the property of session-key computational fairness. The key point is to put A (resp., B) into the input of d (resp., e). Specifically, we have the following fixing approaches, by setting (1) Unfortunately, we failed in providing the provable security for any of the above HMQV variants in the CK-framework. In particular, we do not know how to extend the security proof of HMQV in [37] to any of the above four fixing solutions. Indeed, HMQV was very carefully designed to enjoy provable security in the CK-framework. Below, we present some concrete obstacles in extending the proof of HMQV [37] to these HMQV variants. But, there can be more obstacles.
• For the first and the second solutions, we note that the proof of HMQV for the case of A = B (specifically, the proof of Lemma 24 in Section 6.3) fails. The underlying reason is: the inputs of d and the inputs of e share some common values, such that in the repeated experiment of redefining e the value d will also be changed.
• For the third and the fourth solutions, we do not know how to extend the proofs of Lemma 11 (to be more precise, Case-3 of Claim 13), Lemma 17 and Lemma 29 to these two solutions. The underlying reason is: the messages to be signed by the signerB by the underlying XCR or DCR signatures (defined in accordance with the third and the fourth solutions) are the fixed value (B, B), while in HMQV the message to be signed is its peer's identityÂ that may be set by the adversary. In addition, for the fourth solution, the proof of Lemma 27 also fails. The underlying reason is about the order of d and e in order to compute the value X b . Also, the third and the fourth solutions have the following disadvantage that, in case the intermediate private value y + eb (computed byB in a session) is leaked, this leaked value allows an adversary to impersonateB in any other sessions (no matter what the values (X, A) are).
Besides lacking provable security in the CK-framework, many other advantageous features enjoyed by (s)OAKE (as clarified in Section 4) are also lost with the above fixing solutions. To the best of our knowledge, we do not know how to achieve, besides the OAKE family, implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols that enjoy all the following properties: (1) provable security in the CK-framework; (2) online optimal efficiency and/or reasonable deniability; (3) session-key computational fairness. The surrounding issues are quite subtle and tricky, and indeed (s)OAKE was very carefully designed to achieve all these features (and much more as clarified in Section 4).
G Security Analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-Framework
One of main conceptual contributions of the analysis of HMQV in the CK-framework [37] 
G.1 A New Family of Signature Schemes, and Divided Forking Lemma
Notation note: For presentation simplicity, in this subsection, we a bit abuse the notations of a, c, d, e, f, k, s, z, ρ, C, which are different from the notations used outside this subsection.
A common paradigm, known as the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [24] , of obtaining signatures is to collapse a 3-round public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge, known as Σ-protocol, into a non-interactive scheme with hash functions that are modeled to be random oracles [9] .
Definition G.1 (Σ-protocol [16])
A three-round public-coin protocol P, V is said to be a Σ-protocol for an N P-relation R if the following hold:
• Completeness. If P , V follow the protocol, the verifier always accepts.
• Special soundness. From any common input U of length n and any pair of accepting conversations on input U , (a, e, z) and (a, e ′ , z ′ ) where e = e ′ , one can efficiently compute w such that (U, w) ∈ R with overwhelming probability. Here a, e, z stand for the first, the second and the third message respectively and e is assumed to be a string of length l (that is polynomially related to n) selected uniformly at random in {0, 1} l .
• Perfect/statistical SHVZK (special honest verifier zero-knowledge). There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) simulator S, which on input U (where there exists an N P-witness w such that (U, w) ∈ R) and a random challenge stringê, outputs an accepting conversation of the form (â,ê,ẑ), with the same probability distribution as that of the real conversation (a, e, z) between the honest P (w), V on input U .
The first Σ-protocol (for an N P-language) in the literature can be traced back to the honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) protocol for Graph Isomorphism [27] (but the name of Σ-protocol is adopted much later in [16] ), and a large number of Σ-protocols for various languages have been developed now. Σ-protocols have been proved to be a very powerful cryptographic tool, and are widely used in numerous important cryptographic applications. Below, we briefly recall the Σ-protocol examples for DLP and RSA.
Σ-Protocol for DLP [54] . The following is a Σ-protocol P, V proposed by Schnorr [54] for proving the knowledge of discrete logarithm, w, for a common input of the form (p, q, g, U ) such that U = g w mod p, where p, q are primes g is an element in Z * p of order q. Normally, the length of q, |q|, is denoted as the security parameter.
• P chooses r at random in Z q and sends a = g r mod p to V .
• V chooses a challenge e at random in Z 2 l and sends it to P . Here, l is fixed such that 2 l < q.
• P sends z = r + ew mod q to V , who checks that g z = aU e mod p, that p, q are prime and that g, h are of order q, and accepts iff this is the case.
Σ-Protocol for RSA [31] . Let n be an RSA modulus and q be a prime. Assume we are given some element y ∈ Z * n , and P knows an element w such that w q = y mod n. The following protocol is a Σ-protocol for proving the knowledge of q-th roots modulo n.
• P chooses r at random in Z * n and sends a = r q mod n to V .
• P sends z = rw e mod n to V , who checks that z q = ay e mod n, that q is a prime, that gcd(a, n) = gcd(y, n) = 1, and accepts iff this is the case.
The Fiat-Shamir paradigm and its provable security. Given any Σ-protocol (a, e, z) on common input U (which will be viewed as signing public-key), the Fiat-Shamir paradigm collapse the Σ-protocol into a signature scheme as follows: (a, e = h(a, m), z), where m is the message to be signed and h is a hash function. Note in actual signature scheme with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, the generated signature only consists of (e, z) as the value a can be computed from (e, z). The provable security of the general Fiat-Shamir paradigm is shown by Pointcheval and Stern [53] in the random oracle model (assuming h to be an idealized random function). The core of the security arguments of Pointcheval and Stern [53] is a forking lemma.
On-line/off-line signature. The notion of on-line/off-line signature is introduced in [23] . The idea is to perform signature generation into two phases: the off-line phase and the on-line phase. On-line/offline signature schemes are useful, since in many applications the signer (e.g., a smart-card) has a very limited response time once the message is presented (but it can carry out costly computations between consecutive signing requests). The on-line phase is typically very fast, and hence can be executed even on a weak processor. On-line/off-line signature schemes are particularly remarkable in smart-card based applications [55] : the off-line phase can be implemented either during the card manufacturing process or as a background computation whenever the card is connected to power.
Note that for signature schemes obtained via the Fiat-Shamir scheme, the signer can pre-compute and store a list of values (a = g r , r). Then, to sign a message m, it simply computes e = h(a, m) and z. With Schnorr's signature as an illustrative example, in this case, the signer only needs to perform z = r + h(m, a)w online, where a = g r and r are offline pre-computed and stored. Some general transformation from any signature scheme to secure off-line/off-line signature scheme are know (e.g., [23, 55] ), but typically are not as efficient (for both computational complexity and space complexity of the signer) as the signature resultant directly via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The DSS scheme [25] is a variant of Schnorr's signature [54] via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. The general structure of DSS is as follows:
• Public-key: U = g w ∈ G ′ , where w ∈ Z * q . Typically, w is a 160-bit prime.
• Secret-key: w.
• Signature generation: Let m ∈ {0, 1} * be the message to be signed.
1. Compute a = g r mod p, where r is taken randomly from Z q . Compute d = f (a), where f : G ′ → Z * q is a conversion function. Typically, for DSS with G ′ = Z * p , f is just the "mod q" operation; for DSS with G ′ being some elliptic curve group over a finite field (i.e., a stands for an elliptic curve point (x, y)), f (a) is to take the x-coordinate of a.
Compute s from the equation h(m)
= sr − dw mod q, as follows:
h is a hash function.
3. Output (d, s) as the signature.
• Signature verification: Given (e = h(m), d, s) where d, s ∈ Z * q , the verifier verifies the signature as follows:
Recall that in the DSS scheme, the signature is generated as: (d, s = er −1 +dwr −1 ), where e = h(m), d = f (a) and a = g r , w is the secret-key. In general, the conversion f : G ′ → Z * q also can be viewed as RO. Observe that the value m (i.e., the message to be signed) and the value a = g r are not put into the input of a single RO in the DSS scheme, contrary to signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir scheme where (m, a) is put into the single RO h. The separation of m and a in the inputs of ROs and the way of signature generation of DSS bring the following advantage to DSS.
Specifically, the signer can pre-compute a list of values a's (just as in signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm), but contrary to signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, the signer of DSS does not need to store these pre-computed values. Specifically, for each pre-computed value a = g r , the DSS signer can off-line compute d = f (a), r −1 and dwr −1 , and only stores (d, r −1 , dwr −1 ) (note that it is unreasonable to assume the message to be signed is always known beforehand). Actually, for smart-card based applications, the values (d, r −1 , dwr −1 )'s can be stored during the card manufacturing process. Note that d, r −1 , dwr −1 ∈ Z q while a ∈ G ′ . Suppose G ′ = Z * p (where p is typically of 1024 bits while q is of 160 bits) and the signer pre-computes k values of a, then in comparison with Schnorr's signature scheme the space complexity (of storing pre-computed values) is reduced from (|p| + |q|)k to 3|q|k. But, we remark that for implementations of DSS based on elliptic curves, such an advantage is insignificant.
Challenge-divided Σ-protocols and challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Next, we show a modified Fiat-Shamir paradigm, named challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm, that is applicable to a variant of Σ-protocol with divided random challenges (that is referred to as challenge-divided Σ-protocol). Below, we first describe the challenge-divided Σ-protocols for DLP and RSA.
Challenge-divided Σ-Protocol for DLP. The common input is the same as that of Schnorr's protocol for DLP: (p, q, g, U ) such that U = g w mod p.
• V chooses a pair of challenges d, e at random in Z 2 l × Z 2 l and sends (d, e) to P . Here, l is fixed such that 2 l < q.
• P sends z = er + dw mod q (resp., z = dr + ew) to V , who checks that g z = a e U d mod p (resp.,
, that p, q are prime and that g, h are of order q, and accepts iff this is the case.
Challenge-divided Σ-Protocol for RSA. Let n be an RSA modulus and q be a prime. The common input is (n, q, y), and the private input is w such that y = w q mod n.
• P sends z = r d w e mod n (resp., z = r e w d mod n) to V , who checks that z q = a d y e mod n (resp., z q = a d y e mod n), that q is a prime, that gcd(a, n) = gcd(y, n) = 1, and accepts iff this is the case.
The challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm for challenge-divided Σ-protocols. Let F be a one-way function (OWF) admitting challenge-divided Σ-protocols, i.e., the range of the OWF has a challenge-divided Σ-protocol for proving the knowledge of the corresponding preimage w.r.t. the N Prelation {(U, w)|U = F (w)}. Let the random challenge be of length Len. Denote by d, e the (divided) random challenges, and let U = F (w) be signer's public-key and w the secret-key. To sign a message m, the signer computes a, d =f (a), e =h(m), and z, and then outputs (d, z) as the signature on m, whereh andf are conversion functions from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} Len . In security analysis in the RO model, we assume bothh andf are hash functions that are modeled to be random oracles.
Challenge-divided Schnorr signature scheme. With Schnorr's Σ-protocol for DLP as an illustrative instance, the transformed signature via the above challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm is called challenge-divided Schnorr signature. Note that for signatures from the above challenge-divided Schnorr's Σ-protocol for DLP, we have thatf = f andh = h are conversion functions from {0, 1} * to Z * q . In practice, f can simply be the "mod q" operation for G ′ = Z * p or the operation of taking input's x-coordinate when G ′ is some elliptic curve group over a finite field. In the following, we directly describe the online/offline version of challenge-divided Schnorr's signature.
• Public-key: U = g −w ∈ G ′ , where w ∈ Z * q .
• Message to be signed: m.
• Offline pre-computation: the signer pre-computes and stores (r, d, dw) (resp., (d, rd)), where r is taken randomly by the signer from Z * q , a = g r , d = f (a). The signature verifier can pre-compute e = h(m) andê = e −1 , in case it knows m before receiving the signature.
• Online signature generation: After receiving the message m to be signed, the signer computes e = h(m), retrieves the pre-stored value (r, d, dw) (resp., (d, dr)), and computes z = er + dw (resp., z = dr + ew). The signer outputs (d, z) as the signature on m.
• Signature verification: given a signature (e = h(m), d, z) where
. Note thatê = e −1 can be offline pre-computed by the verifier, in case it knows the message m before receiving the signature.
Theorem G.1 Assuming h, f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l /{0} ⊆ Z * q are random oracles where l is the security parameter (for presentation simplicity, we assume the range of ROs is {0, 1} l rather than {0, 1} l /{0}), the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the DLP assumption.
Proof. We mainly provide the proof for challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw, the proof for the case of z = dr + ew is similar.
Given a polynomial-time and successful forger F, i.e., F successfully outputs (after polynomially many adaptively chosen queries to the signing oracle and random oracles), with non-negligible probability in polynomial-time, a valid signature on a new message that is different from those queried to the signing oracle, we build an efficient solver C for the DLP problem, namely, C gets as input a random element U = g −w in G and outputs the corresponding discrete logarithm w also with non-negligible probability. For presentation simplicity, we assume the random oracles h, f are identical, namely we use the unique RO h to handle all RO queries e = h(m) and d = h(a). The algorithm C is presented in Figure 4 .
For the description of C in Figure 4 , suppose F makes Q RO queries and R signing oracle queries (where Q and R are some polynomials in the security parameter l), we have the following proposition:
Proposition G.1 With probability at most (RQ + R 2 /2)/(q − 1) (that is negligible), C fails in one of
Step S3 of signature simulations (note that, assuming F never fails at Step S3 in signature simulations, the signature simulations are perfect). C fails at Step F3 with probability at most (2Q + 3)2 −l .
Building the DLP solver C from the challenge-divided Schnorr forger F Setup: The input to C is a random element U = g −w in G, and its goal is to compute w. To this end, C provides F with a random tape, and runs the forger F as the challenge-divided Schnorr signer of public-key U . RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracle h, under the limitation that if the same h query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as in the first time. Signature query simulation: Each time F queries the signing oracle for a challenge-divided Schnorr signature on message m i , 1 ≤ i ≤ R, chosen by F adaptively, where m i denotes the message in the i-th query, C answers the query as follows (note that C does not know the secret-key w corresponding to the public-key U = g w ):
where l is the output length of the RO h. If h(m) has been defined by previous query to h, then sets e i = h(m), otherwise chooses e i ∈ R {0, 1}
l and defines h(m) = e i .
S2. Computes a
S3. If h(a i ) has been previously defined, C aborts its run and outputs "fail". Otherwise, sets h(a i ) = d i .
Recall that, for presentation simplicity, we have assumed f = h.
S4. C responds to F 's signing query m i with the simulated signature (d i , z i ).
When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold:
F2. m was not queried by F to the signing oracle previously, i.e., m = m i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R.
F3. The values h(m) and h(a) were queried from the RO h.
If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the "repeat experiments" below; in all other cases C halts and outputs "fail". The repeat experiments. C runs F again for a second time, under the same public-key U and using the same coins for F . There are two cases according to the order of the RO queries of h(m) and h(a):
C1. h(m) posterior to h(a): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(m), responds back a new independent value e ′ ∈ R {0, 1} l . All subsequent actions of C (including random answers to subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a valid signature (d, z ′ ) for the message m, i.e., e ′ = h(m), d = h(a) and a = g
C2. h(a) posterior to h(m): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(a), responds back a new independent value d ′ ∈ R {0, 1} l . All subsequent actions of C (including random answers to subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a valid signature (d ′ , z ′ ) for the message m, i.e., e = h(m), d ′ = h(a) and a = g It is easy to check that suppose C never fails at Step S3, the signature simulations by C are of identical distribution with that of real signatures by using the secret-key w.
Next, we limit the upper-bound of Step S3 failure. Note that for each a i generated by C at Step S2, it is distributed uniformly in G \ 1 G . In the RO model, there are two cases for C fails at Step S3: Case 1. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, F ever successfully guessed the value a i in one of its Q random oracle queries. Thus, the probability that C fails in Case 1 is at most RQ/(q − 1).
Case 2. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, the value a i has ever been generated in dealing with the j-th signing oracle query, j < i. The probability that C fails in Case 2 is at most
R is the combination number of selecting two elements from a set of R elements. Finally, it is easy to check that C fails at Step F3 with probability at most (2Q + 3)2 −l . To see this, first note that there are two possibilities for F to output d = h(a) without making RO query with a: (1) F directly guesses the value d = h(a), which occurs with probability 2 −l . (2) The value d = h(a) collides with some other values from the RO answers (i.e., h(a) = h(a ′ ) for some a ′ queried by F to RO). As F makes at most Q RO queries, the latter case can occur with probability at most Q2 −l . Thus, with probability at least 1 − (Q + 1)2 −l , F knows a (i.e., queries the RO with a). Note that from (a, d, z) the value log
is (which should be equal to h(m) = e) is then determined. Conditioned on this, the probability e = h(m) = log
is 2 −l , as e is distributed uniformly over {0, 1} l . Thus, F does not query h(m) with probability at most (Q + 1)
Thus, suppose the forger F succeeds (i.e., outputs a valid signature (d, z) for a new message m different from those queried) with non-negligible probability in its real attack against the signer of public-key U , F succeeds in the first run of C in Figure 4 also with non-negligible probability (up to a gap at most (QR + R 2 /2)/(q − 1)). Then, with non-negligible probability (with a gap at most (QR + R 2 /2)/(q − 1) + (2Q + 3)2 −l to the success probability of F in its real attack), C does the repeated second run.
For presentation simplicity, we write the signature of challenge-divided Schnorr on a message m as (m, e = h(m), a, d = h(a), z). Note that given a pair of different signatures on the same m (and a): {(m, e, a, d, z), (m, e ′ , a, d, z ′ )} that corresponds to Case C1 in Figure 4 , or, {(m, e, a, d, z), (m, e, a, d ′ , z ′ )} that corresponds to Case C2 in Figure 4 , the value w computed by C is correct. Thus, to finish the theorem, what left is to show that conditioned F succeeds in outputting the valid (m, e, a, d, z) in the first run of C, with non-negligible probability F will also succeed in Case C1 or Case C2 of the repeated second run. We note that this can be shown by a straightforwardly extended version of the Pointcheval-Stern forking lemma [53] (that was originally developed to argue the security of digital signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm). For completeness, we reproduce the forking lemma tailored for signature schemes via the challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm, referred to as divided forking lemma.
Suppose F produces, with probability ε ′ , a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z), within the time bound T in its real attack against the signer of public-key U , then with probability at least ε = (ε ′ − (QR + R 2 /2)/(q − 1) − (2Q + 3)2 −l )/2 F outputs a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z) in the first run of C described in Figure 4 such that F made both h(m) = e and h(a) = d queries to the RO with the order of h(m) being posterior to h(a) or the order of h(a) being posterior to h(m). Without loss of generality, we assume it is the former case, i.e., the RO query h(m) is posterior to h(a) (the analysis of the case of h(a) being posterior to h(m) is similar). We have the following lemma, from which the theorem is then established.
Lemma G.1 (divided forking lemma) Suppose F produces, with probability ε, a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z) within the time bound T in the first run of C such that F made both h(m) = e and h(a) = d RO queries with the order h(m) being posterior to h(a), then within time T ′ ≤ (2/ε+(ε/4Q−2 −l ) −1 )·T and with probability at least Proof (of Lemma G.1). The proof of Lemma G.1 is essentially identical to that of Lemma 2 in [53] , which we re-produce here for completeness. We mention that, as in [53] , although the divided forking lemma is presented here w.r.t. the challenge-divided Schnorr's signature (based on the challenge-divided Schnorr's Σ-protocol for DLP), it can be directly extended and applied to signatures derived from other challenge-divided Σ-protocols.
Denote by ω the random tape of F, and assume F makes at most Q RO queries Q 1 , · · · , Q Q (for presentation simplicity, we assume all RO queries are distinct), and denote by ρ = (ρ 1 , · · · , ρ Q ) the Q RO answers. It is clear a random choice of the random function h (i.e., the RO) corresponds to a random choice of ρ.
Define S to be the set of (ω, h) such that F h (ω) outputs a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z) in the first run of C, such that F made both h(m) and h(a) RO queries with the order of h(m) being posterior to h(a). That is, Pr[S] = ε. Define Ind(ω, h) to be the index of the RO query h(m), i.e., m = Q Ind(ω,h) . Define S i be the subset of S such that Ind(ω, h) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ Q. That is, the set {S 1 , · · · , S Q } is a partition of S. Define I = {i|P r[S i |S] ≥ 1/2Q}, i.e., Pr[S i |i ∈ I] ≥ ε/2Q. For each i ∈ I, define by h i the restriction of h to queries of index strictly less than i, they by applying the Splitting Lemma (Lemma 1, page 12 in [53] ), there exists a subset Ω i (of S) such that: (1) 
(for more details, the reader is referred to [53] ). By the Lemma 3 (page 14) in [53] , we get Pr[Ind(ω, h) ∈ I|S] ≥ 1 2 . Now, run F 2/ε times with random ω and h, with probability 1 − (1 − ε) 2/ε ≥ 4 5 we get one successful pair (ω, h) ∈ S. Denote by β the index Ind(ω, h) corresponding to the successful pair. We know with probability at least 1 4 , β ∈ I and (ω, h) ∈ S β ∩ Ω β . Consequently, with probability at least 1 5 , the 2/ε runs have provided a successful pair (ω, h) ∈ S β ∩ Ω β where β = Ind(ω, h).
. Now, we replay F with fixed ω but randomly chose h ′ such that h ′ β = h β , for (ε/4Q − 2 −l ) −1 times, with probability at least 3 5 , we will get another success. That is, after less than 2/ε + (ε/4Q − 2 −l ) −1 repetitions of F's attack, with probability at lease Challenge-divided Schnorr vs. DSS. We note all performance advantages of DSS (recalled in Appendix G) are essentially preserved with the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme. We also note the techniques proposed in [47] for improving the performance of DSS in certain scenarios, e.g., signature batch verification and compression, etc, are also applicable to challenge-divided Schnorr. In addition, challenge-divided Schnorr has the following advantages over DSS:
• Same or better offline space complexity than DSS (much better than Schnorr scheme for implementation based Z * p . Suppose k values of a's are pre-computed, the offline space complexity of challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw is 3k|q| (which is the same as that of DSS); But, for challenge-divided Schnorr with z = dr + ew, the offline space complexity is only 2k|q|.
Note that, for Schnorr signature scheme, suppose G ′ = Z * p (where p is typically of 1024 bits while q is of 160 bits) and the signer pre-computes k values of a, then in Schnorr's signature scheme the space complexity (of storing pre-computed values) is (|p| + |q|)k.
• More efficient signature generation in total. To compute the value s in the DSS-signature (recalled in Appendix G), the signer of DSS performs 1 modular inverse (i.e.,r = r −1 ) and 2 modular multiplications in total. In comparison, to compute the value z in the challenge-divided Schnorr signature, the signer only performs 2 modular multiplications in total (without performing the modular inverse operation). We remark that modular inverse is a relatively expensive operation (which is typically performed by the Euclid algorithm), and is thus much preferable to dispense with (particularly for smart-card-based deployment).
• More efficient offline pre-computation. Besides the same other pre-computations, the signer of DSS needs to perform 1 modular inverse r −1 and 2 modular multiplications for computing dwr −1 , but the signer of challenge-divided Schnorr needs to offline perform only 1 modular multiplication dw or dr.
• More efficient online signature verification (for the case of z = er + dw). For verifying a DSSsignature (d, s), the verifier has to computeŝ = s −1 online (which is a relatively expensive operation), as the value s is known to the verifier only when the signature comes to it. In comparison, for verification of challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw, the verifier only needs to compute the inverseê = e −1 where e = h(m). In case the verifier learns the message to be signed prior to receiving the signature from the signer (which is quite common in certain scenarios), the values e and e −1 can both be offline pre-computed by the verifier of challenge-divided Schnorr. For challenge-divided Schnorr with z = dr + ew, signature verification is of the same computational complexity as that of DSS.
• Provable security in the random oracle model. We show that, assuming both h and f are random oracles, the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks [29] under the DLP assumption in the RO model.
Challenge-divided Schnorr vs. Schnorr. For implementations of challenge-divided Schnorr and Schnorr based over order q subgroups of Z * p , where p is typically of 1024 bits and q is of about 160 bits, similar to DSS in this case, challenge-divided Schnorr enjoys much better offline space efficiency than Schnorr. However, for elliptic curve based implementations of both challenge-divided Schnorr and Schnorr, such offline space efficiency advantage disappears. As mentioned, the introduction of challengedivided Schnorr is mainly to introduce the divided forking lemma to be used in the analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework.
G.2 Casting (s)OAKE in Terms of Online Efficient and Strongly Secure HDR Signatures
Informally speaking, a HDR signature scheme is an interactive signature scheme between two parties in the public-key model. The two parties generate the same signature, which is actually a hashed value of the DH-secret shared between the two parties, with the dual roles of signer and challenger: each party generates the signature with private values of its static secret-key and the secret DH-exponent with respect to its peer's DH-component and public-key as the challenges. With a HDR signature, we are only interested to ensure verifiability of the signature by the two intended parties, and thus we make no assumptions or requirements regarding the transferability or verifiability of the signature by a third party. Roughly speaking, a HDR signature scheme is secure if the signature cannot be generated by any other parties other than the two intended (honest) parties. Note that the online efficiency of (s)OAKE-HDR can be only one exponentiation for each player. In comparison, each player of HMQV-HDR performs about 1.3 online exponentiations. For presentation simplicity, in the above HDR signature description we assume the CA in the underlying PKI will check the membership G \ 1 G of registered public-keys, and each player checks the membership G \ 1 G of its peer's DH-component. These subgroup tests may not be necessary for the security of HDR in general, assuming no ephemeral private state is exposed, and thus can be relaxed in some scenarios (see [37, 45] for more details).
(s)OAKE in a nutshell. Actually, the above OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR can be viewed as a general structure of the (s)OAKE protocols. Specifically, OAKE and sOAKE are instantiated with OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR respectively, with the special mÂ and mB that are set to be the empty string. In general, mÂ (resp., mB) can include some values sent toÂ (resp.,B) fromB (resp.,Â), which does not affect the pre-computability of (s)OAKE. In particular, in practice with pre-computed and reused DH-components, mÂ (resp., mB) can include a random nonce generated and sent byB (resp.,Â).
In the following, we show the security of OAKE-HDR, sOAKE-HDR with off-line pre-computed DH-exponents, DH-components, and the values A yc or B xd (that may be potentially exposed to the forger even prior to the session involving these pre-computed values), on which the security of OAKE and sOAKE in the CK-framework will be based. In particular, we show that our OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR satisfy a stronger security definition (than the definition given in [37] ) in accordance with Definition 5.2.
On the strong security of HDR. The strong security of our definition for HDR lies in that:
• We assume (y, Y, A cy ) are off-line pre-computed, and the forger can get them prior to the session run involving them.
This particularly renders stronger capability to the attacker to perform colliding (birthday) attacks against the hash function h (that is of length |q|/2 for HMQV). To deal with this subtlety, the actual HMQV implementation needs some changes in practice (to be clarified later).
• In the forging game defined in Figure 2 , the successful forgery requires that the whole vector (Â, A, m 1 , m 0 , X 0 , Y 0 ) did not appear in any of the responses ofB to F's queries. The definition for the security of HCR in [37] only requires that the pair (Y 0 , m 0 ) did not appear in responses from the signer. As we shall see, the HMQV-HDR scheme may not be strongly secure in general.
OAKE-HDR vs. HMQV-HDR. In [37] , the HMQV-HDR (ofB) is defined to be {X, Y, DSIG
, e = h(mB, Y ). For building HMQV with HMQV-HDR, mB (resp., mÂ) is set to be its peer's identityÂ (resp.,B). The underlying HMQV-XCR-signature is defined to be X y+be , where e = h(mB, Y ). The following are some brief comparisons between OAKE-HDR and HMQV-HDR:
• One notable advantageous feature of OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR is the online efficiency.
Specifically, the online efficiency of OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR, for each player, can be only one exponentiation. In comparison, each player of HMQV-HDR performs about 1.3 online exponentiations.
• As we shall see, the OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR are strongly secure in accordance with Definition 5.2. We note that the HMQV-XCR underlying HMQV-HDR is not strongly secure. S3.B checks that X ∈ G \ 1 G (if not, it aborts) and that (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, Y ) is in one of its incomplete sessions (if not, it ignores the query). C checks for every value σ ∈ G \ 1 G previously used by F as input to H K whether σ = Z y X b+ye , where e = h(mẐ, mB,Ẑ, Z,B, B, X, Y ) (in case of undefined e, C defines it with the RO h). It does so using the DDH-oracle O, specifically, by checking whether CDH(X, B) = (σ/Z y X ye ). If the answer is positive, then C sets r to the already determined value of H K (σ).
S3.1.
k , where k is the output length of H K . Note that, in this case, C does not know σ = Z y X b+ey , as it does not know b, which also implies that C does not make (actually realize) the RO-query H K (σ) even if the value σ has been well-defined (with predetermined d and e) and known to F . RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracles h and H K (made by F ), under the limitation that if the same RO-query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as in the first time. But, for each new query σ to H K , C checks whether σ = Z y X b+ey for any one of the stored vectors (Ẑ, Z, mẐ, mB, X, y, Y, Z y , r) (as before, this check is done using the DDH-oracle). If equality holds then the corresponding r is returned as the predefined H K (σ), otherwise a random r is returned. Upon F 's termination. When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold: If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the "repeat experiment" below, else it aborts. The repeat experiment. C runs F again for a second time, under the same input (B, X 0 ) and using the same coins for 
where a and a ′ are the private keys of the uncorruptedÂ andÂ ′ (different fromB, which are assumed to be known to C). Proof. This case implies that the forger F can output, with non-negligible probability, a successful forgery of the form: (m 1 , m 0 ,B, B,B , B, X 0 , X 0 , r 0 ), where 0 ,B, B, X 0 ), e 0 = h(X 0 , X 0 ) for OAKE-HDR (for sOAKE-HDR, c 0 = d 0 = 1 and e 0 = h(m 1 , m 0 ,B, B,B, B, X 0 , X 0 ) ). Note that from σ 0 andB's secretkey b, we can compute X x 0 0 . But, as mentioned, the hardness of computing X x from random X is equivalent to that of the CDH problem [42, 46] .
With the above observations, we modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 5 as follows:
• C knows (sets) also the private key b forB. By knowing the private key b, C dispenses with the DDH-oracle in order to make the answers to RO-queries to be consistent.
• The analysis show that, in case of successful forgery against the signer itself with Y 0 = X 0 , the security not only is based on the weaker hardness assumption (say, the CDH assumption rather than the GDH assumption), but also of tighter security reduction (to the underlying hardness assumption, say the CDH assumption here).
Now we consider the case of Y 0 = X 0 . As mentioned, it is the only place we need to additionally use the KEA assumption.
Definition G.3 [Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA)] Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q generated by an element g, and consider algorithms that on input a triple (g, C = g c , z) output a pair (Y, Z) ∈ G 2 , where c is taken uniformly at random from Z * q and z ∈ {0, 1} * is an arbitrary string that is generated independently of C. Such an algorithm A is said to be a KEA algorithm if with non-negligible probability (over the choice of g, c and A's random coins) A(g, g c , z) outputs (Y, Z) ∈ G 2 such that Z = Y c . Here, C = g c is the random challenge to the KEA algorithm A, and z captures the auxiliary input of A that is independent of the challenge C.
We say that the KEA assumption holds over G, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) KEA algorithm A for G there exists another efficient algorithm K, referred to as the KEA-extractor, for which the following property holds except for a negligible probability: let (g, g c , z) be an input to A and ρ a vector of random coins for A on which A outputs (Y, Z = Y c ), then, on the same inputs and random coins, K(g, C, z, ρ) outputs the triple (Y, Z = Y c , y) where Y = g y .
Corollary G.2 Under the GDH assumption, and additionally the KEA assumption, (public-key free) OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR signatures ofB, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y, A cy ), are strongly secure in the random oracle model, with respect to the signerB itself with Y 0 = X 0 .
Proof. The proof of Corollary G.2 follows the same outline of that of Theorem G.2. We highlight the main differences, and how the KEA assumption comes into force in the security analysis. The analysis is mainly w.r.t. OAKE-HDR (the similar, and actually simpler, hold also for sOAKE-HDR).
The main difference between the proof of Corollary G.2 and that of Theorem G.2 is that, here, the forger outputs with non-negligible probability a successful forgery of the form: (m 1 , m 0 ,B, B,B . The key point is that, by performing the rewinding experiments, we cannot directly output the CDH(B, X 0 ), as we do not know the private key b ofB (recall that we are going to compute CDH(B, X 0 ) by running the forger F). Note that in the security analysis of Theorem G.2, we heavily relied on the fact that we know the private key of any uncorrupted player other than the signer itself.
We modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 5 as follows: the actions of C remain unchanged until the rewinding experiments; C performs the rewinding experiments according to the order of the RO-queries c 0 , d 0 , e 0 . 
G.2.1 Extension to Robust (s)OAKE-HDR Signatures
In this section, we show that the security analysis of (s)OAKE-HDR signatures can be extended to robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures. We first re-describe the robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures: For the security analysis of the robust (s)OAKE variant, the exposed values A cy and B dx for (s)OAKE are changed to be A b+cy and B a+dx .
Security analysis extension for the case ofÂ =B. We note that the proof of Theorem G.2 can be straightforwardly extended to robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures, by the following observations:
• In Step S3 and for answering RO queries, to ensure the consistency of RO queries with each σ previously queried by F to the RO H K , the challenger C checks whether σ = Z b+cy X bd+ye by checking whether CDH(B, X d Z) = σ/Z cy X ye = Z b X db = (X d Z) b via its DDH oracle.
• The repeat experiments can still go through because that:B =Â,Â is an uncorrupted player and the challenger knows the secret-key a. Thus the value A b+cy = (BY c ) a can be removed from σ.
Security analysis extension for the case ofÂ =B and X = Y . The security analysis of robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures for this case is essentially the same as in the analysis of Corollary G.1.
Security analysis extension for the case ofÂ =B and X = Y . The key differences, in comparison with the proof of Corollary G.2, are that:
• For robust OAKE-HDR signature, the output of the challenger C during the rewinding experiments is CDH(B, Proof (of Proposition G. 2) . First recall that the hardness of computing B b from random B = g b is equivalent to that of the CDH problem [42, 46] . Thus, the ability of computing CDH(B, X) (given (B, X)) is equivalent to the ability of computing B b (given B only), which then implies the ability of computing CDH(X d B, B) = X bd B b .
Suppose there exists an efficient algorithmÃ that can compute CDH(X d , B) = X db B b (from B and X) with non-negligible probability, then there exists another efficient algorithmB that can breaks the CDH assumption with also non-negligible probability. The input ofB is a random element B ∈ G \ 1 G , and its goal is to break the CDH assumption by computing CDH(B, B) = B b . Towards this goal,B generates X = g x where x is taken uniformly at random from Z * q , and then runsÃ on input (B, X). According to the above discussions, given random elements (B, X), under the CDH assumption no efficient algorithm can compute either CHD(B, X) or CDH(X d B, B) with non-negligible probability.
In addition, in view of the fact that c = d = 1 for robust sOAKE-HDR signature, there is another analysis method for robust sOAKE-HDR signature. Specifically, given random elements U, V , the challenger C sets (in the Setup procedure) that: B = V and X 0 = (U/B) (rather than X 0 = U ). Note that, in this case, the output of the challenger C during the rewinding experiments is CDH(X 
G.3 Analysis of (s)OAKE with Offline Pre-Computation in the CK-Framework
Brief description of the CK-framework. In the CK-framework for a DHKE protocol, a CMIM adversary A controls all the communication channels among concurrent session runs of the KE protocol. In addition, A is allowed access to secret information via the following three types of queries: (1) state-reveal queries for ongoing incomplete sessions; (2) session-key queries for completed sessions; (3) corruption queries upon which all information in the memory of the corrupted parties will be leaked to A. A session (Â,B, X, Y ) is called exposed, if it or its matching session (B,Â, Y, X) suffers from any of these three queries.
The session-key security (SK-security) within the CK-framework is captured as follows: for any complete session (Â,B, X, Y ) adaptively selected by A, referred to as the test session, as long as it is unexposed it holds with overwhelming probability that (1) the session-key outputs of the test session and its matching session are identical; (2) A cannot distinguish the session-key output of the test session from a random value. At a high level, the SK-security essentially says that a party that completes a session has the following guarantees [14] : (1) if the peer to the session is uncorrupted then the sessionkey is unknown to anyone except this peer; (2) if the unexposed peer completes a matching session then the two parties have the same shared key.
The Requirement-1 can be trivially checked for both OAKE and sOAKE. In the following, we focus on establishing the Requirement-2.
Denote by (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 ) the unexposed test-session between a pair of uncorrupted playersÂ and B whereÂ =B, and by H K (v) the session-key of the test-session that is referred to as the test HDRsignature, where v = A cy X db+ey = B dx Y ca+ex . As H K is a random oracle, there are only two strategies for the adversary A to distinguish H K (v) from a random value:
Key-replication attack. A succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session (other than the testsession or its matching session) that has the same session-key output as the test-session. In this case, A can learn the test-session key by simply querying the session to get the same key (without having to learn the value of the test HDR-signature).
Forging attack. At some point in its run, A queries the RO H K with the value v. This implies that A succeeds in computing or learning the test HDR-signature (i.e., the session-key of the test-session) via its attacks. For presentation simplicity, we assume A directly outputs the session-key of the test-session, referred to as the test-signature, via a successful forging attack.
The possibility of key-replication attack is trivially ruled out unconditionally in the RO model, by the NMJPOK and TBSS property of OAKE and sOAKE. Specifically, for any session-tag (Â, A,B, B, X, Y ) and for any value σ ∈ G \ 1 G , the probability Pr[KÂ = KB = σ] ≤ 1 2 l −1 holds for both OAKE and sOAKE, where the probability is taken over only the choice of the random function h. Then, by the birthday paradox (as done in the previous NMJPOK and computational fairness analysis), any efficient attacker can succeed in the key-replication attack only with negligible probability. Actually, as the test-session and its matching session are defined without taking public-keys into account in the CKframework, the possibility of key-replication attack is trivially ruled out unconditionally in the RO model also for the public-key free variant of (s)OAKE. Specifically, for any test-session (Â,B, X, Y ) and any session (Â ′ ,B ′ , X ′ , Y ′ ) that is unmatched to the test-session (which implies that at least of the following inequalities holds:Â =Â ′ ,B =B ′ , X = X ′ and Y = Y ′ ), it holds that Pr[KÂ = KÂ ′ ] = 1 2 l −1
. As the attacker is polynomial-time, it cannot make two unmatched sessions to output the same session-key with non-negligible probability.
Note on security reduction tightness. We note that, however, the analysis of HMQV to rule out key-replication attack in [37] is quite complicated, and is still reduced to the underlying hardness assumptions (to be precise, to the unforgeability of HMQV-HDR). That is, the analysis of (s)OAKE in order to rule out the key-replication attacks is not only much simpler, but also does not go through costly security reductions.Also, as we shall see, sOAKE is at least as tight as HMQV in other parts of the security analysis. We did not try to make a direct comparison on the security reduction tightness between OAKE and HMQV, as they use different forking lemma.
Then, in the following analysis, we only focus on ruling out the forging attack. Recall thatÂ =B for the test-session (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 ) held byÂ. In the rest, we make analysis mainly with respect to the OAKE protocol, the similar and actually simpler hold also for sOAKE. Now, suppose there is an efficient KE-attacker A who succeeds, by forging attacks, against the test-session (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 ) withÂ =B (particularly, A = B), we present an efficient forger F against the underlying OAKE-HDR signature, which contradicts the security of the underlying OAKE-HDR signature scheme (that is based on the GDH assumption), and thus establishing the theorem. F works as follows, by running A as a subroutine.
1. We assume F successfully guessed the unexposed test-session (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 ) held atÂ, wherê A =B.
2. The inputs of F are (B, X 0 ), and F has oracle access to the OAKE-HDR signerB of public-key B.
3. F sets the inputs to all parties other thanB, and thus can perfectly emulate these parties. In particular, F can deal with state-reveal queries, session-key queries by A on any session other
